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Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate
Whistleblowing Moral in the New Era of Dodd-Frank
Act “Bounty Hunting”
MATT A. VEGA
If you can imagine Wall Street as the American Old West and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) as the local sheriff, then the SEC’s new bounty program is
the equivalent of nailing up reward signs all over town that read: “Wanted: Dead or
Alive.” The agency is looking for information regarding publicly traded companies,
financial services institutions, and other covered entities who may have violated U.S.
securities laws, and it is willing, more than ever, to pay a premium for the information.
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Act that, among
other things, amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by adding Section 21F
“Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection.” This obscure and little debated
section offers whistleblowers multi-million dollar “bounties” for reporting suspected
securities law violations directly to the SEC. Under the program, which went into effect
last year, the SEC is required to pay as a bounty to whistleblowers who voluntarily provide
the agency with “original information” an amount equal to 10% to 30% of any monetary
sanctions exceeding $1 million dollars. When the average SEC settlement is over $18.3
million dollars, whistleblowers can expect the average bounty to be well in the range of $2
million to $5 million dollars.
This new program is fundamentally flawed because it attempts to combat corporate
opportunism by encouraging employee opportunism. To solve systemic problems like
securities fraud and foreign bribery, the SEC needs to look beyond financial incentives. It
needs to take a step back and consider the basic moral principles of mutual self-interest and
subsidiarity. These normative arguments were sorely missing in the debates leading up to
the final rules implementing the bounty program. These principles make clear that what is
missing from Congress’s latest effort is mandatory internal reporting.
This Article endorses the Whistleblower Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 2483, which
was introduced by Congressman Michael Grimm in the first session of the 112th Congress
and would require internal reporting as a condition for money benefits under the SEC’s
new bounty program. This amendment is needed not just to make corporate compliance
programs work in the new era of SEC bounty hunting, but to make whistleblowing morally
upright.
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Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate
Whistleblowing Moral in the New Era of Dodd-Frank
Act “Bounty Hunting”
MATT A. VEGA
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of the whistleblower as an institution is one of the most
significant developments in corporate governance in the last fifty years.
Despite the importance of this development, the role of the whistleblower
in corporate compliance has received relatively little scholarly attention.1
Most of the existing scholarship concerning whistleblowers has focused on
analyzing the unwillingness or incapacity of employees to blow the
whistle,2 and these arguments are often overstated and lack empirical
validation. In addition, these arguments usually gloss over the deep
tension in our society’s understanding of whistleblowing by emphasizing
that informants have provided some assistance in law enforcement efforts
that benefit society and that the end justifies the means. This debate over
when or, better yet, how to get employees to blow the whistle should not
trump the more fundamental analysis of the whistleblower institution itself
as a moral enterprise. Our failure to expand the whistleblower inquiry
beyond prudential concerns is shortsighted and is leading to perverse
consequences,3 such as the new whistleblower bounty program of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or the “Commission”)
mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer


Associate Professor of Law, Thomas Goode Jones School of Law, Faulkner University. J.D.,
1993, Yale Law School. Formerly in-house counsel for Federal Express Corporation, where the author
was responsible for various aspects of the company’s regulatory compliance programs. A special
thanks to Associate Dean Tim Chinaris for his support in obtaining a research grant to make this Article
possible, to professors Michael J. DeBoer, Layne Keele, Adam J. MacLeod, and Robert L. McFarland
for their helpful insights, and to my research assistants Kaleb Steinhauer and Melissa Grimm-Maddox
for their able help.
1
Throughout this Article, I use the terms “corporate governance” and “corporate compliance”
interchangeably.
2
See Jayne W. Barnard, Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission,
71 U. PITT. L. REV. 403, 410 (2010) (summarizing arguments that suggest a bounty program is
necessary to encourage whistleblowing).
3
See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Elec., 808 F. Supp. 580, 584 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (criticizing the
Department of Justice for the perverse way it treats its informants as adversaries rather than allies).
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Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”). The Dodd-Frank Act, among other
things, amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”)
by adding Section 21F entitled “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and
Protection” to significantly expand the SEC’s existing whistleblower
bounty program.5
This Article argues that the most significant problem with the SEC’s
new bounty program is that it does not mandate that corporate
whistleblowers report violations internally before going to the SEC in
order to qualify for the award. Under the bounty program, corporate
whistleblowers are confronted with the Hobson’s choice of either reporting
directly to the SEC and maximizing their prospects for a financial award,
or giving the corporation the opportunity to do the right thing and risk
getting nothing. Although the final rules add certain incentives intended to
encourage employees to utilize their company’s internal compliance
programs, the provisions do not go far enough because whistleblowers are
not required to use a company’s internal reporting system. Instead, the
SEC assumes the employee is in the best position to decide whether to
cooperate with internal compliance efforts. The agency further assumes
that the corporation will not do the right thing, even if prompted by internal
members.
Part II of this Article explores the changing role and understandings of
whistleblowers. It describes the tension between the two competing views
of whistleblowers as rats and heroes. Modern regulatory attempts to
accommodate both views of whistleblowing have left the whistleblower
laws increasingly incoherent. Essentially, regulators have opted to avoid
the fundamental moral questions altogether and have chosen instead to
treat whistleblowing as a mere instrumentality or tool for prosecutors to
4

4
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 41 U.S.C.).
Passed by the House on December 11, 2009, and passed with amendments by the Senate on May 20,
2010, the Dodd-Frank Act constitutes “a sweeping overhaul of the financial regulatory system.” Press
Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President on 21st Century Financial
Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-thePresident-on-Regulatory-Reform/. While many of its provisions related primarily to financial
institutions, the Act also required the creation of a number of new rules for corporate governance
affecting public companies in the United States, such as: “say-on-pay” and “say-on-severance”
provisions permitting non-binding shareholder votes on executives’ compensation and golden
parachutes every three years; the independence of compensation committees; certain prohibitions and
reporting requirements for financial institutions regarding compensation structures; guidance regarding
auditing, attestation, and related professional practice standards for brokers and dealers; and
clarification that any accounting firm preparing an audit report for an issuer that is a non-accelerated
filer will not be required to attest to, and report on, the internal control assessment made by the issuer’s
management. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act §§ 721, 723, 733, 735, 951–53, 955, 982, 989G, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 1a, 2, 7, 7b-3 (2010), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n, 78n-1, 7201, 7262 (2010) (providing compliance, reporting,
and auditing requirements for publicly traded companies promulgated under the Dodd-Frank Act).
5
Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2010).
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gather useful information. This strictly pragmatic view of whistleblowing
is particularly evident in the SEC’s new whistleblower bounty program,
which appeals without apology to an informant’s greed and shows little
regard for an employee’s duty to report potential compliance problems
internally before going to the SEC.
Part III of this Article briefly describes the Dodd-Frank Act’s new
Section 21F whistleblower bounty program and the SEC’s final rules
implementing the program that went into effect on August 12, 2011.6 This
program offers whistleblowers more protection from retaliation, as well as
monetary bounties for reporting suspected securities law violations directly
to the SEC.7 Under the program, the SEC is required to pay a bounty to
whistleblowers who voluntarily provide the SEC with “original
information” about a potential securities law violation that leads to a
successful SEC or “related” enforcement action and results in monetary
sanctions of sufficient size.8
Part IV of this Article explores the consequences of treating
whistleblowing as a mere instrumentality. The bounty program turns the
very concept of a “whistleblower” on its head and hinders internal efforts
to promote a strong culture of ethical corporate compliance. It discourages
“real” whistleblowing by encouraging employees to remain silent until a
possible violation reaches the optimum point to present to the SEC a worst
case scenario and collect their reward. In addition, it may actually increase
retaliation against whistleblowers by creating intrafirm adversarialism
where none previously existed. In so doing, the bounty program may
ultimately undermine the moral legitimacy of the whistleblowing
enterprise altogether.
Drawing mostly from perfectionist theories of jurisprudence, Part V
articulates a unifying theory of the role of whistleblowers. The
whistleblowing institution is a moral enterprise, and it should be treated as
such. The moral approach to whistleblowing can also overcome problems
that the mere instrumentality approach to whistleblowing—where the
whistleblower has a legal right to be uncooperative with his or her
employer’s compliance efforts—cannot. Making whistleblowing moral
reduces transaction costs and enhances performance; therefore,
corporations have more incentive to value—rather than merely to
tolerate—whistleblowers. To be moral, whistleblowing and the laws and
6
The SEC’s final rules (“SEC Rules”) are currently codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-1 et seq. and
the whistleblower forms are available at 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.1800 and 249.1801. The new rules apply
retroactively to tips provided on or after July 21, 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act’s enactment date.
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300 (June 13, 2011).
7
See id. at 34,301 (summarizing the potentially greater rewards and the retaliation protections of
the proposed rule).
8
Id. at 34,305.
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organizational rules promoting whistleblowing must, at a minimum,
respect two basic ideas: (1) the common good of mutual self-interest and
(2) the communitarian principle of subsidiarity.
The common good of mutual self-interest rests on an understanding
that corporate laws and regulations shape the corporation as a community,
and that community matters, especially when it comes to finding a
legitimate role for whistleblowers in corporate compliance. In addition,
the principle of subsidiarity demands that whistleblowers try to resolve a
potential compliance problem internally at the lower corporate level before
reporting it externally to government at a higher level.
Support for these two guiding principles is found in a wide range of
legal philosophies and theories, including the work of perfectionist
scholars like Joseph Raz,9 new natural law theorist John Finnis,10 and
communitarian virtue ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre.11
Additionally,
empirical research and theory developed in the field of organizational
behavioral management (“OBM”) over the last couple of decades support
more consideration of both of these moral factors.12
Together, these two ideas contribute to a unifying theory that helps to
explain the role of whistleblowers in corporate compliance, and they also
provide more substantive criteria of judgment to evaluate and critique the
SEC’s regulations implementing the bounty program. Mutual self-interest
aligns whistleblowing specifically (and corporate compliance more
generally) along a more coherent axis that turns on the common good of
community. The principle of subsidiarity has a paradoxical quality that
helps balance the tension between the ideals of belonging to a corporate
community and affirming an allegiance to the rule of law. It avoids the
collapse of corporate compliance into either the unworkable top-down
approach of traditional command-and-control measures or the ideological
abstraction of “pure” self-regulation.
As a practical matter, this unifying theory highlights the need to make
internal whistleblowing mandatory under the SEC’s new bounty program
with certain exceptions. This Article supports a bill introduced to the
112th Congress to amend the Dodd-Frank Act to require internal reporting
as a condition for money benefits. This legislation offers a reasonable
9
See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 206 (1986) (suggesting that being part of a
society or institution can be intrinsically good).
10
See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 305 (1980) [hereinafter FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW] (“[T]he common good is the good of individuals, living together and depending upon
one another in ways that favour the well-being of each.”).
11
See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 187–88 (2d ed.
1984) (describing goods internal to human practices which result in excellence over that form of
activity).
12
See LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE 247–49 (2011) (discussing the effects of
economics literature that describes self-interest as rational).
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approach for addressing both the prudential and normative questions raised
in this Article.
II. THE EVOLVING ROLES OF CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWERS
This Part describes the evolution of the whistleblower’s role in
corporate governance. Although most legal scholarship regarding the role
of private actors in corporate compliance has focused on lawyers, auditors,
and institutional shareholders as gatekeepers, rather than whistleblowers,13
over the last several years many fraud and bribery scandals have come to
light because of whistleblower tips.14 Because whistleblowers are now
playing an increasingly important role in the actual governance of
corporations, they deserve greater consideration in legal scholarship.15
This Article focuses exclusively on employee whistleblowers. The
SEC broadly defines a “whistleblower” as any individual who alone or
jointly with others provides the Commission with information relating to a
possible violation of the federal securities laws.16 This definition includes
vendors, service providers, consultants, business competitors and other
third parties, as well as employees of the offending company.17 However,
when an employee blows the whistle there is tension between his or her
duties and responsibilities as both a citizen and a corporate citizen that
does not exist for whistleblowers generally.18 This tension revolves around
13
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of
Employees: Participatory Management and Natural Law, 43 VILL. L. REV. 741, 742 (1998) (discussing
programs in which employees participate in corporate compliance decisions); John W. Cioffi,
Irresistible Forces and Political Obstacles: Securities Litigation Reform and the Structural Regulation
of Corporate Governance (Comparative Research in Law & Political Econ., Research Paper No.
7/2006) (describing reforms as restructuring the private sphere to improve corporate compliance),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=902648.
14
Nina Schichor, Does Sarbanes-Oxley Force Whistleblowers to Sacrifice Their Reputations? An
Argument for Granting Whistleblowers Non-Pecuniary Damages, 8 U.C. DAVIS. BUS. L.J. 272, 292
(2008) (“Our post-Enron society depends on whistleblowers to help regulate private industry.”
(footnote omitted)).
15
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley
Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 126 (2007) [hereinafter Rapp,
Beyond Protection] (suggesting that the merits of internal versus external whistleblowing deserves
further consideration).
16
See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2 (2012) (“You
are a whistleblower if, alone or jointly with others, you provide the Commission with information . . .
and the information relates to a possible violation of Federal securities laws.”).
17
See id. (providing only that a whistleblower must be an individual, and not a company or
another entity, and noting that a company or another legal entity is not eligible to be a whistleblower,
only individuals); see also Marc S. Raspanti & Bryan S. Neft, Dodd-Frank Opens Doors on
Whistleblower Claims for Securities Law Violations, LAW. J., May 20, 2011 at 4 (arguing that a
requirement for whistleblowers to report a violation internally prior to submitting an official claim will
have perverse effects).
18
For a general discussion of this tension, see Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational
Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 436–40 (2009).
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the question of whether an employee should disclose what he or she
believes to be unethical or illegal to management (internal whistleblowing)
or to an external authority or the public (external whistleblowing). 19 For
purposes of this Article, “corporate whistleblowing” is defined as “the
disclosure by organization members (former and current) of illegal,
immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to
persons or organizations that may be able to effect [sic] action.”20
Corporate whistleblowers fall into one of three distinct categories: (1)
voluntary whistleblowers; (2) mandatory (or compelled) whistleblowers;
and (3) bounty hunters.21 Voluntary whistleblowing refers to the classic
situation in which an employee chooses to report potential violations of the
law internally or, if necessary, externally. On the other hand, compelled
whistleblowers are required by various laws to monitor the workplace and
to report potential violations to the proper authorities. They are often
referred to by the term “gatekeepers.” Finally, bounty hunters are
generally defined as professionals who provide information and other
services directly to the government for a reward.22
Over the last several decades, corporate whistleblowing has evolved
from strictly voluntary whistleblowing to both voluntary and mandatory
whistleblowing. This change is largely traceable to the passage of modern
corporate laws and regulations in the late 1970s, and again in the late
1990s, that express a decidedly moral view of whistleblowers as allies in
the fight against corporate fraud, bribery, and corruption. For the most
part, this development improved the perception of whistleblowing as a
legitimate “gatekeeper” function in promoting corporate compliance.
Since then, however, legislators and regulators have been sending mixed
signals regarding whistleblowing. Most recently, the SEC has recast
corporate whistleblowers as “bounty hunters.” This paradigm shift
undercuts the moral enterprise of whistleblowing. By becoming a hired
gun for the SEC, the whistleblower risks losing his or her seat at the table
19
See James N. Adler & Mark Daniels, Managing the Whistleblowing Employee, 8 LAB. L. 19,
21–22 n.8 (1992) (further dividing whistleblowers into three subcategories: passive, active, and
embryonic).
20
Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Organizational Dissidence: The Case of Whistle-Blowing, 4
J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 4 (1985).
21
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 323, 330–31 (2007) (describing the three categories of whistleblowers). But see Elizabeth
Tippett, The Promise of Compelled Whistleblowing: What the Corporate Governance Provisions
Sarbanes Oxley Mean for Employment Law, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 12–13 (2007) (further
distinguishing “compelled whistleblowing” from “mandatory whistleblowing”).
22
See James Fisher et al., Privatizing Regulation: Whistleblowing and Bounty Hunting in the
Financial Services Industries, 19 DICK. J. INT’L L. 117, 143 (2000) (concluding that the professional
bounty hunter model may become essential to enforcement of existing regulations in the financial
services industry). Technically, the term “bounty hunters” is a bit of a misnomer when applied to
corporate whistleblowing since most employees are not professional informants. Id. at 136–37.
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of corporate compliance generally. If left unchanged, the SEC regulations
that implement the Dodd-Frank Act’s new bounty program threaten to turn
back the clock on whistleblowers by more than half a century by treating
whistleblowing as a necessary evil motivated by financial gain rather than
by moral responsibility.
A. Whistleblowers as Rats
Historically, many policymakers viewed whistleblowers as “rat[s]” and
“snitches.”23 For example, during the 1998 debate in Congress over
whether to dismantle the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) whistleblower
program, Senator Harry Reid of Nevada argued for the end of what he
called the “Snitch Program” and the “Reward for Rats Program.”24 Even
regulators who were responsible for protecting whistleblowers treated
employees who blew the whistle on their employers as morally suspect.25
For example, a former Reagan Administration official in charge of the
federal whistleblower program reportedly called them “malcontents.”26
Despite the government’s low opinion of whistleblowers, the incidence
of whistleblowing has steadily increased.27 Published case law from both
federal and state courts confirms that prior to 1977, only three reported
federal or state cases dealt directly with whistleblowing.28 During the
1980s, however, over 300 published opinions addressed whistleblowing. 29
In the 1990s, 2,207 cases involved whistleblowing, seven times the number
from the prior decade.30 For many employment lawyers in the mid-1990s,
this increase made whistleblowing cases “the hottest niche of their
23
Marshal J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public
Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1142 (1999); see also C. Fred
Alford, Whistle-Blower Narratives: The Experience of Choiceless Choice, 74 SOC. RES. 223, 244
(2007) (“[T]hose who raise ethical issues are treated as disturbed or morally suspect.”).
24
144 Cong. Rec. S4397–98 (daily ed. May 6, 1998) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid).
25
See Gene A. Brewer & Sally Coleman Selden, Whistle Blowers in the Federal Civil Service:
New Evidence of the Public Service Ethic, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 413, 419 (1998)
(describing negative stereotypes sometimes associated with whistleblowers).
26
Id.
27
See Eve Tahmincioglu, More Workers Willing to Blow the Whistle on Their Employer,
NBCNEWS.COM (Sept. 15, 2012, 4:15 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44524270/ns/businesscareers/t/more-workers-willing-blow-whistle-their-employer/#.UFTf_o42d8t (noting the increase in
whistleblower claims and analyzing possible causes).
28
E.g., Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123, 125 (10th Cir. 1953) (affirming the
district court’s dismissal of a wrongful discharge claim); Percival v. General Motor Corp., 400 F. Supp.
1322, 1324 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (“[D]ischarge did not involve a breach of public policy sufficient to state a
cause of action for wrongful or retaliatory discharge.”); Reagan v. Bichsel, 284 S.W.2d 935, 936–38
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (holding that a police officer’s suspension for conduct prejudicial to good order
was supported by substantial evidence).
29
The list of cases as of October 31, 2012 is on file with the author [hereinafter Whistleblower
Cases].
30
Id.
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practice.” Finally, the number of whistleblower suits has tripled over the
last decade, with over 7,700 published cases mentioning whistleblowing
since January 2000.32
This increase may be due to an increased willingness to confront
corporate wrongdoing, or it could be because of an overall increase in the
level of corporate corruption generally. Regardless, this dramatic increase
in litigation has prompted fears that whistleblowers are unduly disruptive
and harassing.33 Several states have responded by modifying their
whistleblower laws to make it clear that whistleblowers can be held liable
for bringing frivolous claims.34 While a degree of skepticism about the
merits of a complaint is justifiable, the legislative history behind these
provisions confirms that a deep distrust of whistleblowers remains a part of
American policymakers’ psyche.35
31

B. Whistleblowers as Heroes
Ironically, the failure of public enforcement efforts to regulate
31
Gary Taylor, Blowing Whistles: Spilling Beans in the Private Sector Is Now a Big Legal
Business, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 20, 1993, at 37.
32
Whistleblower Cases, supra note 29. This figure includes 6,118 reported cases between
January 2000 and January 2011, with the remaining 1,582 cases being brought within the last eighteen
months. Id. At this rate, more than seventy-three published judicial decisions impact whistleblowers
every month.
33
See Oklahoma to Stem Frivolous Whistleblower Claims, 7 INDIVIDUAL EMPL. RTS. LAB. REL.
REP. (BNA) 2 (June 2, 1992); David Culp, Whistleblowers: Corporate Anarchists or Heroes? Towards
a Judicial Perspective, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 109, 131 (1995) (suggesting that implicit in judicial and
legislative policies is the belief that employers ought to remain free to choose which employees to
keep).
34
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1-304(e)(1)–(f)(2) (2008) (providing that a statutory causeof-action for retaliatory discharge is not to be used for frivolous lawsuits or other “improper
purpose[s],” and any employee who files a frivolous lawsuit is subject to sanctions, including
attorneys’ fees). Some states require good faith in bringing claims. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 8547.2(e) (2012) (stating that a “[p]rotected disclosure” is a “good faith communication”); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 112.3187(9)(d) (West 2008) (requiring an employee who filed a “frivolous action in bad
faith” to pay reasonable costs to the prevailing party); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:967(D) (2010)
(stating that if a “complaint is brought in bad faith” or if court determines that the employer’s act is not
in violation of law, then the employer may be entitled to compensation for attorney fees and court
costs); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 185(e)(1) (2004) (providing that the “court may award
reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs to the employer” for any action that is brought “without basis
in law or fact”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-12 (2012) (stating that employers are prohibited from
retaliating against any employee who “makes a good faith report . . . of a violation”). At least one state
requires both reasonableness and good faith. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52(A)(1)(a) (West
2007). Idaho discourages whistleblowers from bringing suit without any basis in law or fact since a
court may order reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs for such actions unless the employee
dismisses the action within a reasonable time after discovering that the employer is not liable for
damages. IDAHO CODE § 6-2107 (2010). Finally, a few states including Connecticut, Hawaii, and
Michigan require that the employee’s report not be knowingly false. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51m(b)
(2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-62(1) (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 15.362 (2009).
35
See Adler & Daniels, supra note 19, at 19, 29 (discussing requirements in state statutes that aim
to prevent employees from making bad faith or frivolous claims).
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corporations effectively using traditional command-and-control
mechanisms has catapulted whistleblowers to the forefront of corporate
governance. Since 1934, the SEC, in conjunction with the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”), has been the principal enforcer of securities laws.36
However, major public scandals involving large corporations in the late
1970s, and again in the late 1990s, made it evident to policymakers that
effective corporate regulation depended not only on public enforcement by
government agencies, but also on the participation of private citizens
willing to bring compliance problems to light.37
1. Watergate’s Mark Felt
The first transformative moment for whistleblowers in corporate
governance was the Watergate scandal in the late 1970s.38
A
whistleblower named Mark Felt (a.k.a. “Deep Throat”) helped Bob
Woodward break the story that led to President Nixon’s resignation in
1974.39 The revelation that President Nixon’s reelection campaign had
used illegally acquired corporate funds to finance the break-in of the
Democratic National Committee Headquarters eroded the trust of
Americans in their government. Subsequent investigations by the Senate
and the Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, however, led to an
even more startling revelation: hundreds of publicly traded U.S. companies
had made corrupt foreign payments involving hundreds of millions of
dollars.40 In fact, between 400 and 500 publicly traded companies,
including Exxon and Lockheed Martin, admitted to having made
questionable payments or outright bribes amounting to over $300 million
to obtain contracts from foreign governments.41
See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Sept.
24, 2012) (describing the SEC’s roles and responsibilities as an enforcement authority of the securities
laws). But see James D. Cox et al., SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J.
737, 739 (2003) (noting that Congress, in the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, created a few express
private causes of action).
37
See Howard Rockness & Joanne Rockness, Legislated Ethics: From Enron to Sarbanes-Oxley,
the Impact on Corporate America, 57 J. BUS. ETHICS 31, 31 (2005) (describing the role of the Enron
scandal on regulatory policy); Alexander W. Sierck & Keith S. Watson, Post-Watergate Business
Conduct: What Role for the SEC, 31 BUS. LAW. 721 (1976) (describing the role of Watergate on
regulatory policy).
38
See Sierck & Watson, supra note 37, at 724–26 (describing the expanded role the SEC has
taken in determining what information a company must disclose).
39
Todd S. Purdum, ‘Deep Throat’ Unmasks Himself: Ex-No. 2 at F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
2005, at A1; see also Schichor, supra note 14, at 273.
40
Frederick M. Lawrence, In Memoriam, Archibald Cox, 85 B.U. L. REV. 355, 356 (2005); Matt
A. Vega, Balancing Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether Transnational Corporations Are
Liable for Foreign Bribery Under the Alien Tort Statute, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 385, 404–05 (2010)
(arguing that the prohibition against foreign bribery has become customary international law).
41
Vega, supra note 40, at 405.
36
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In response, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977 (“FCPA”).42 The FCPA made bribery of foreign government
officials a crime.43 It also required companies registered with the SEC to
maintain accurate books and records and to develop a system of internal
accounting controls.44 These internal controls included, among other
things, establishing internal whistleblowing procedures.45
More than a decade passed, however, before either the SEC or the DOJ
began to take FCPA enforcement seriously. Eventually, however, the SEC
and the DOJ began more aggressive enforcement efforts, and many of the
enforcement actions were made possible by tips from corporate
whistleblowers.46 While some continued to see whistleblowers as
“traitorous violators of organizational loyalty norms,” others began to see
them as “heroic defenders of values considered to be more important than
company loyalty.”47
2. Enron’s Sherron Watkins
The second transformative moment was the Enron and
MCI/WorldCom financial scandals.48 The highlight of congressional
hearings on Enron and MCI/WorldCom was testimony regarding the
actions of two key whistleblowers, Sherron Watkins and Cynthia Cooper.49
In her testimony, “Sherron Watkins revealed crucial details regarding
Enron’s fraudulent activities.”50 Similarly, the CEO of MCI/WorldCom
42
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(b)(2), 30A, 32, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2), 78dd-1 to -2,
78ff, (2006), added by Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (requiring accurate accounting and
internal controls for all transactions and rendering bribes to foreign officials by company officers
illegal with penalties such as fines and imprisonment).
43
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to -2 (2006).
44
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2006).
45
See id.
46
Schichor, supra note 14, at 292 (arguing that greater compensation for whistleblowers will
encourage more to step forward and mitigate the personal impact whistleblowers endure).
47
Joyce Rothschild & Terance D. Miethe, Whistle-Blower Disclosures and Management
Retaliation, 26 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 107, 125 (1999).
48
See Rockness & Rockness, supra note 37, at 31 (discussing how scandals such as Enron and
WorldCom prompted Congress to respond with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to legislate ethical behavior for
certain firms); J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the
Collapse of American Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. REG. 207, 259 (2003)
(discussing how WorldCom’s deception “harmed the telecommunications industry,” and as a result led
the Federal Communications Commission to respond).
49
Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 74–75 (2007) (suggesting improvements to
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act based on analysis showing whistleblowers generally have been unsuccessful in
winning compensation for their actions).
50
Id.; see also The Financial Collapse of Enron-Part 3: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 14–15 (2002)
(testimony of Sherron Watkins, Vice President of Corporate Development, Enron Corp.) (discussing
the deceptive information that Sherron Watkins was aware of in her position at Enron).
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testified about how an internal auditor named Cynthia Cooper had
discovered the massive fraud orchestrated by the company’s CFO and
reported it to the board of directors.51 These testimonies convinced
legislators to do more to convince potential whistleblowers to come
forward in future cases and to protect them from retaliation.52
Accordingly, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(“SOX”),53 which included, among other things, the first set of
comprehensive federal whistleblower provisions protecting employees who
raise concerns about a violation of any federal criminal statute.54 Section
301 of SOX requires that audit committees establish internal whistleblower
procedures allowing employees to report anonymously concerns about
questionable accounting or auditing.55 In addition, Section 1107 of SOX
gives the DOJ discretionary authority to impose criminal penalties on
companies or individuals that retaliate against whistleblowers who
participate in an official proceeding or tender information directly to a law
enforcement officer.56 Finally, Section 806 of SOX grants corporate
whistleblowers the right to bring a private civil action if they were subject
to retaliation for reporting a violation of any securities laws or SEC
regulations.57
However, SOX went beyond merely protecting voluntary
whistleblowers; it also mandated whistleblowing. It required several key
insiders, including corporate in-house lawyers and CEOs, to function as

51
Wrong Numbers: The Accounting Problems at WorldCom: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 129 (2002) (statement of John W. Sidgmore, President & CEO, WorldCom,
Inc.).
52
See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 4–5 (2002) (discussing the need to break the “code of silence”
keeping potential whistleblowers from coming forward).
53
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.).
54
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1107, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (providing that covered employees
who raise concerns about a violation of any federal criminal statute, not simply laws limited to financial
fraud, cannot be retaliated against); see also Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. SEC, Opening
Statement at SEC Open Meeting: Item 2 Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511mls-item2.htm
[hereinafter
SEC
Opening
Statement] (acknowledging that SOX “made great strides in creating whistleblower protections and
requiring internal reporting systems at public companies”).
55
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(B) (2006).
56
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1107, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2006). The SEC has seldom, if ever,
brought any criminal prosecutions under Section 1107 of SOX. See Daniel P. Westman, The
Significance of the Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Provision, 21 LAB. LAW. 141, 147 (2005)
(establishing that there is no apparent record of any criminal prosecutions brought under Section 1107
to date).
57
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1980.101
(2011) (interpreting Section 806 to hold not only corporations, but also individuals liable for retaliating
against a whistleblower).
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58

both gatekeepers and whistleblowers.
SOX required that in-house
attorneys, for example, report suspected violations up the ladder in the
corporation and then report those violations to the SEC if the internal
reports do not resolve the violations.59 SOX also imposed direct
responsibility on executive officers.60 In addition to certifying the
accuracy of the company’s SEC filings, the principal executive and
financial officers must certify that they designed and evaluated the internal
controls to ensure that any material information was made known to
them.61
After the Enron and MCI/WorldCom hearings and the passage of
SOX, whistleblowers were seen in a different light. In particular, corporate
whistleblowers were viewed as heroes serving a critical “gatekeeping”
role.62 A broader conception of whistleblowing as a moral enterprise
began to emerge, as the media described whistleblowers as unsung saviors
and the new “saints of secular culture.”63 In 2002, for example, TIME
magazine named Sherron Watkins and Cynthia Cooper as “Persons of the
Year.”64 Even policymakers spoke more favorably of whistleblowers. For
example, Senator Charles Grassley, speaking of the IRS bounty program,
called informants “patriotic and described them as protectors” of taxpayer
dollars.65

58
See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2–
3 (2006) (discussing the history, roles, and capabilities of gatekeepers); John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1294 (2003) (arguing that
securities attorneys do play a gatekeeping role that does not conflict with representing their clients and
that the SEC should adopt standards that enhance this role); Caroline Harrington, Attorney Gatekeeper
Duties in an Increasingly Complex World: Revisiting the “Noisy Withdrawal” Proposal of SEC Rule
205, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 893, 896 (2009) (discussing the attorney’s role as a gatekeeper under
SOX).
59
17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3(b)(1), (b)(9) (2011).
60
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2006).
61
Id. These provisions have been implemented by Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 Rules
13a-14 and 13a-15. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-14, 240.13a-15 (2011). See also Certification of Disclosure
in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,276, 57,280 (Sept. 9, 2002) (explaining
that the new Exchange Act Rules 13a-15 require issuers to file reports to maintain disclosure controls
and procedures as defined in the new Exchange Act Rule 13a-14(c)).
62
See Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 15, at 95 (implying that a bounty model to
compensate whistleblowers is preferred because SOX fails to increase incentives for insiders with
knowledge of fraud); Schichor, supra note 14, at 273 (explaining how a WorldCom whistleblower,
Cynthia Cooper, “won applause from the media, Congress, and the general public” for playing a
significant role in uncovering fraud).
63
Colin Grant, Whistle Blowers: Saints of Secular Culture, 39 J. BUS. ETHICS 391, 398 (2002)
(characterizing whistleblowers as achieving new, high moral ground in society); Richard Lacayo &
Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year 2002: The Whistleblowers, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1003998,00.html (naming whistleblowers as
“Persons of the Year”).
64
Schichor, supra note 14, at 292; Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 63.
65
Lobel, supra note 18, at 488 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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C. Whistleblowers as Bounty Hunters
The current global financial crisis has proven to be a third
transformative moment for whistleblowers in corporate governance.66
Despite increased enforcement efforts, securities fraud, foreign bribery,
and other forms of corporate corruption are at an all-time high.67 The crisis
began here in the United States with reports of a multi-million dollar Ponzi
scheme on Wall Street,68 but the Bernie Madoff story was just the tip of the
iceberg.69 From Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, “the events of the last decade demonstrate that securities
fraud is repeatedly perpetrated against unsuspecting investors.”70
Many legal scholars have blamed this financial crisis on, of all things,
the lack of financial incentives for corporate whistleblowers.71 They have
argued that SOX did not go far enough.72 What is needed, according to

66
See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The Global Financial Crisis and Its Impact on World Trade and
the World Economy—An Overview, 41 UCC L.J. 375, 377–78 (2009) (discussing the historical
significance and global impact of the ongoing financial crisis and the landmark structural changes that
have resulted to prevent it from happening again).
67
See, e.g., ETHICS RESEARCH CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY: AN INSIDE VIEW OF
PRIVATE SECTOR ETHICS v (2007) (concluding that “[e]thical misconduct in general is very high and
back at pre-Enron levels” within the national firms surveyed); KROLL, GLOBAL FRAUD REPORT:
ANNUAL EDITION 2008/2009 6–7 (2008) (noting increases in overall incidence of corporate fraud and
weakening internal controls among firms surveyed globally).
68
See U.S. SEC, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO
UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME 1–2 (2009), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf (detailing the SEC’s failures to detect the Madoff fraud).
69
See Miriam H. Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 950 (2009)
(arguing the meltdown of the mortgage security market came about because “numerous people in
varying positions of public and private power ignored internal company policies, twisted regulatory
requirements, or perpetrated outright violations of the law”).
70
Elizabeth Cosenza, Is the Third Time the Charm? Janus and the Proper Balance Between
Primary and Secondary Actor Liability Under Section 10(b), 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1022 (2012)
(arguing for amendment to the Exchange Act to overcome court imposed restrictions on private
lawsuits against secondary actors).
71
See Pamela H. Bucy, “Carrots and Sticks”: Post-Enron Regulatory Initiatives, 8 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 277, 318–22 (2004) [hereinafter Bucy, “Carrots and Sticks”] (arguing for a carrot approach to
encourage provision of inside information to regulators); Cunningham, supra note 21, at 325 (“The
prevailing regime’s overwhelming emphasis on sticks offers limited assurance of success. That system
failed during the late 1990s and early 2000s.”); Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural
Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1133–38 (2006) [hereinafter
Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model] (stating that the “pre-scandal versions of the Structural
Model, like the Anti-retaliation Model, failed to encourage effective whistleblowing”); Rapp, Beyond
Protection, supra note 15, at 93 (discussing the recent corporate scandals and suggesting financial
incentives should be strengthened for whistleblowers). But see Baer, supra note 69, at 950 (“[T]he
meltdown of the mortgage security market . . . came about because numerous people in varying
positions of public and private power ignored internal company policies, twisted regulatory
requirements, or perpetrated outright violations of the law.”).
72
See Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1769 (2007)
(arguing that SOX fails to provide effective whistleblower protections); Mary Kreiner Ramirez,
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these scholars, is a new government program to radically increase the
economic incentives for whistleblowers to do the right thing.73 Professor
Rapp, for example, in his influential article lamented the fact that SOX was
just “defensive” and failed to “radically increase” financial incentives for
whistleblowers.74 In fact, there was nearly universal support among legal
scholars for a new bounty program.75
A bounty program was not a completely new idea for the SEC. In
1988, Congress passed Section 21A(e) of the Exchange Act authorizing the
SEC to award a bounty of up to 10% of the civil penalty recovered in
insider trading cases.76 However, this insider trading bounty program had
several shortcomings: first, the program only awarded whistleblowers for
tips concerning insider trading that are, by their very nature, particularly
secretive; second, the grant of any reward was within the sole discretion of
the SEC; and third, it was seldom used.77 Not surprisingly, there were only
seven payouts to five whistleblowers under the former program for a
meager total of $159,537.78 Aware of these shortcomings, Professor Bucy
(now Pierson) of the University of Alabama School of Law advocated for
the significant ramping up of the SEC insider trading bounty program in a
seminal article published less than two years after the insider trading
bounty program was first established.79
The Obama Administration quickly embraced the idea of a more
Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 183, 187–88 (2007) (“SOX does
little to change the hazardous path whistleblowers must tread.”).
73
See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, False Claims, Not Securities Fraud: Towards Corporate
Governance by Whistleblowers, 15 Nexus: CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 61 (2009) [hereinafter Rapp, False
Claims] (suggesting SOX’s anti-retaliation measures “may do little to alter the cost-benefit analysis
engaged in by a potential whistleblower”).
74
Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 15, at 95.
75
See, e.g., M. Thomas Arnold, “It’s Déjà Vu All over Again”: Using Bounty Hunters to
Leverage Gatekeeper Duties, 45 TULSA L. REV. 419, 459 (2010) (proposing the establishment of a
bounty system); Barnard, supra note 2, at 409 (calling for the creation of an SEC bounty program for
informants); Bucy, “Carrots and Sticks,” supra note 71, at 318–22 (recommending a system utilizing
the carrot approach of the False Claims Act (“FCA”) private justice model); Cunningham, supra note
21, at 327 (“Positive incentives can induce gatekeepers to perform vital functions that the current
regime discourages them from performing.”); Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 15, at 92 (calling
for the adoption of a bounty model).
76
15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (1988).
77
See U.S. SEC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC’S BOUNTY
PROGRAM 2, 4, 12–13, 31 (2010) (providing an in-depth review of the bounty program and
recommendations to improve functioning); Bruce Carton, SEC IG’s Report Details Insider Trading
Bounties, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.complianceweek.com/sec-igs-report-detailsinsider-trading-bounties/printarticle/188244/ (discussing the rarity of payments under the bounty
program).
78
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 111 (2010).
79
Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1, 60–62 (2002). This article was one of
the first, if not the first, to propose using FCA-like qui tam enforcement to help police securities laws
generally.
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robust whistleblower bounty program as advocated by Professors Bucy and
Rapp. In 2009, the Administration floated a proposal to amend Section
21F to expand the existing SEC program beyond insider trading and
establish a fund to pay whistleblowers “significant financial awards” for
tips.80 The proposal was made a part of the Investor Protection Act of
2009, but the bill was never passed by the 111th Congress.81 Eventually,
however, the 112th Congress authorized a new bounty program as part of
the Dodd-Frank Act.82
The new bounty program has led, almost overnight, to a whole new
cottage industry of lawyers specializing in corporate whistleblowing.83
Encouraged by several early signs, one major firm has declared 2012 to be
the “Year of the Whistleblower.”84
The downside of making whistleblowing highly profitable is that it
may cause whistleblowers to lose some of their legitimizing status as
corporate gatekeepers. As bounty hunters, they become just the latest
example of employee greed. The bounty program assumes that corporate
whistleblowers are selfish and greedy, and the agency appears to believe
that it must appeal to their “self-interest” with insanely large incentives to
get them to cooperate with external enforcement efforts.85 The entire
premise of the bounty program is that only a large bounty will motivate a
80
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 70–
73, available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf.
81
Investor Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3817, 111th Cong. § 203 (2009); Rapp, False Claims,
supra note 73, at 58. Professor Rapp proposes an even more radical idea that whistleblowers be
permitted to bring qui tam actions on behalf of the federal government—as the shareholder-in-chief of
several bailed-out American companies—against those who perpetrated what is traditionally thought of
as only securities fraud. Id. at 59–60.
82
See infra Part III (discussing the details of the final program under Dodd-Frank Act).
83
See, e.g., KLINE & SPECTER, http://www.attorneysforwhistleblowers.com (last visited Aug. 24,
2012) (calling themselves “National Whistleblower Attorneys”).
84
Phillips & Cohen, 2012: Year of the Whistleblower (Dec. 28, 2011),
http://www.phillipsandcohen.com/P-C-News/2012-Year-of-the-Whistleblower.shtml. The first signal
came two days after the SEC announced its new bounty program, when the SEC dramatically increased
the reward under its old insider-trading program. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. SEC, SEC Awards $1
Million for Information Provided in Insider Trading Case (July 23, 2010), available at
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21601.htm (announcing that the SEC paid its “the largest
award . . . for information provided in connection with an insider trading case”). Other telltale signs
included increased activity pertaining to the bounty programs of other federal agencies. For example,
the DOJ announced a $750 million settlement of criminal and civil actions stemming from a
whistleblower suit against the pharmaceutical manufacturer GlaxoSmithKline brought under the FCA.
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Recovers $3 Billion in
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2011 (Dec. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-civ-1665.html. The IRS has enhanced its bounty
program and recently paid out a $104 million whistleblower award. Jackson Lewis, IRS Awards
Unprecedented $104 Million to Whistleblower (Sept. 12, 2012), available at
http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4195.
85
See Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 15, at 111–13 (arguing that the decisions of potential
whistleblowers are based on an analysis of the costs and benefits of coming forward).
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sizable percentage of whistleblowers. Thus, the SEC’s program targets
self-interested “bounty hunters,” rather than “real” (unselfish)
whistleblowers, who cooperate because they believe it is the right thing to
do or because they expect their cooperation to benefit others.
86

III. THE BASICS OF THE NEW BOUNTY PROGRAM
The SEC’s new whistleblower bounty program requires that eligible
persons who report potential securities law violations to the SEC be paid
between 10% and 30% of the monetary sanctions imposed on any publicly
traded company, financial services institution or other covered entity in
any SEC action, in which the final judgment or order for monetary
sanctions exceeds $1 million.87
The SEC expects to receive 30,000 tips each year as a result of this
new program.88 The SEC has said it will pay the highest awards to those
individuals who provide specific, credible and timely information that
saves the SEC weeks of investigation time.89 Therefore, the SEC has made
providing tips as easy as possible. The final rules set out a simplified
procedure for a corporate whistleblower to submit information to the SEC
without the need to alert his or her company,90 and this information is then
shared throughout the agency.91 If the SEC eventually brings a covered
action that is eligible for an award, a Notice of Covered Action is posted
on the Office of the Whistleblower website.92 To date, a total of 320 cases
have been listed on this website as potentially eligible for an award
because in each case a court order was entered granting monetary sanctions

86
See id. at 113 (“[B]ecause potential whistleblowers will discount their expected recovery from
whistleblowing by the chance that they will not receive such a recovery, and to account for the time
value of money, a potential financial benefit may need to be quite large in order to stimulate a riskaverse employee to blow the whistle.” (footnote omitted)).
87
Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2010). Within this mandatory range, the SEC
maintains discretion over the actual percentage using criteria provided in the Dodd-Frank Act such as
the significance of the whistleblower’s information. Id. The $1 million threshold amount can be
reached by aggregating multiple cases brought to the agency by the same whistleblower. Id.
88
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,354 (June 13,
2011).
89
SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54.
90
See Tips, Complaints and Referrals Portal, U.S. SEC, https://denebleo.sec.gov/TCRExternal/in
dex.xhtml (last visited Aug. 24, 2012). Whistleblowers are instructed to complete a six-page form and
mail or fax it to the SEC Office of the Whistleblower, or to submit it online through the SEC’s Tip,
Complaint or Referral (“TCR”) Portal. Id.
91
See BOS. CONSULTING GRP., U.S. SEC ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY AND REFORM 44 (2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/967study.pdf (discussing the cross-divisional TCR
project).
92
Claim an Award, U.S. SEC, OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, http://www.sec.gov/about/office
s/owb/owb-awards.shtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
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93

exceeding $1 million. Individuals who submitted original information
related to the covered action then have ninety calendar days from the date
of the posting to apply for an award from the SEC Whistleblower Office.94
When the SEC first released for comment the proposed rules
implementing the Section 21F whistleblower bounty program, they
received more than 240 comments and approximately 1,300 letters
regarding the proposed rules.95 Some commenters suggested they had
gone too far,96 while others insisted they did not go far enough.97 In
response, the SEC revised its final rules to address many of these concerns.
However, despite these efforts, even the SEC Commissioners remained
divided three-to-two on whether to adopt the final rules.98
The specific rules that most impact corporate whistleblowers and their
relationship with their employers include provisions: (1) providing
incentives for whistleblowers to report internally; (2) excluding certain
categories of employees from being eligible for whistleblower payments
altogether; and (3) broadening the definitions of the types of information
which may be reported directly to the SEC for a bounty. 99 The specifics of
the rule choices in each of these areas are summarized below.
A. Internal Whistleblowing Incentives
The SEC declined to require corporate whistleblowers to report
violations internally to their employer first to be eligible for a bounty.100
93
Id. In 2011, 217 cases were listed as eligible for an award. Id. An additional 103 cases have
been posted on the SEC’s “Claim an Award” webpage so far in 2012. Id.
94
FAQs, U.S. SEC, OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/ow
b-faq.shtml (last visited Aug. 24, 2012). The application does not mean that a whistleblower will
automatically receive an award, but if the whistleblower does not submit an application he or she will
have no chance of receiving an award. Id.
95
SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54.
96
See, e.g., Comment from Cynthia M. Fornelli, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Audit Quality 4 (Dec. 23,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-242.pdf (suggesting that
whistleblowers should not be eligible for an award without at a minimum concurrently reporting the
violation internally).
97
See, e.g., Comment from Eric Dixon 2 (Dec. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-221.pdf (arguing that the confidentiality provisions are
not sufficient to provide assurance to whistleblowers).
98
Josef Rashty, The Dodd-Frank Act Addresses Corporate Governance, CPA J., Apr. 2012, at 40.
The new rules will take effect sixty days after their publication in the Federal Register. See also
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,300 (June 13, 2011).
99
See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,301, 34,303
(June 13, 2011) (discussing the proposed rules, comments received, and final rules). The final rules
also include anti-retaliation provisions, which I hope to argue in a later article provides unequal
protection for victims of retaliation; namely, it protects external but not internal whistleblowers. In
addition, it does not adequately remedy SOX’s lack of extraterritorial application. Id. at 34,303–04.
100
Id. at 34,301. The final rules do impose an exhaustion requirement similar to the one
advocated in this Article, but only for individuals that have causal or assignment responsibility for the
securities violation. Id. at 34,316–19.
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This prompted an outpouring of vigorous objections from the corporate
community.101 They argued that the financial incentives would divert
whistleblowers from internal reporting,102 and “[t]hese commenters further
argued that companies and other entities would experience significant costs
as a result.”103 On the other hand, whistleblower advocates argued that
mandating internal whistleblowing is inconsistent with the statute and
would dissuade whistleblowers from coming forward.104 In response, the
SEC incorporated in its final rules several provisions that were intended to
strengthen incentives for employees to report internally but that “ultimately
. . . leave that decision to the whistleblower.”105 According to SEC
Chairperson Mary Schapiro, “[o]ffering financial incentives for
whistleblowers to report appropriate concerns to internal compliance is
unprecedented . . . [but] incentivizing—rather than requiring—internal
reporting is more likely to encourage a strong internal compliance
culture.”106
1. 120-Day “Look-Back” Period
Under the final rules, a whistleblower is deemed to have reported
information to the SEC on the date that he or she makes an internal report
101
See SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54 (“[M]any commenters vigorously asserted that
these programs would only survive if the Commission required whistleblowers to first report internally
before coming to us.”).
102
See, e.g., Comment from David Hirschman, President and CEO, Ctr. for Capital Markets
Competitiveness, U.S. Chamber of Commerce 12 (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-194.pdf (“In the absence of an affirmative restriction
on external reporting when effective internal compliance channels are available, or provision of a
significant incentive for using those internal channels, employees will face an irresistible temptation to
go to the SEC with their report.”); see also Comment from Cynthia M. Fornelli, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for
Audit Quality 2 (Dec. 23, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-242.pdf
(arguing that the credit offered for first reporting to an employer is not sufficient to encourage
employees to utilize internal reporting processes); Comment from Richard F. McMahon, Exec. Dir.,
Edison Elec. Inst. 1 (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310177.pdf (arguing that employees should be required to first use employer-sponsored recording
procedures in order to be eligible for any bounty); Comment from Gen. Elec. Co. 3 (Dec. 17, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-179.pdf (“[W]e believe that the balance
reflected in the Proposed Rules favors too heavily the promotion of whistleblower bounties at the
expense of effective and efficient corporate compliance programs.”).
103
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,359 (June 13,
2011).
104
See Douglas W. Baruch & Nancy N. Barr, The SEC’s Whistleblower Program: What the SEC
Has Learned from the False Claims Act About Avoiding Whistleblower Abuses, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
ONLINE 28, 41 (July 25, 2011), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Baruch-BarrWhistleblower.pdf (discussing the voluntary nature of internal reporting and highlighting the incentives
available to those who choose to first report internally).
105
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,362 (June 13,
2011).
106
SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54.
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to the company, so long as the whistleblower or the company subsequently
reports the information to the SEC within 120 days of the initial internal
report.107 If the company does not report back to the employee within the
120-day period, the employee is then free to report the matter to the SEC
and still be eligible for a bounty.108 Although the 120-day “look-back”
period was not intended to be a deadline for companies to self-report to the
SEC, it effectively limits the window of time that companies have to
complete a thorough investigation because the company must beat the
whistleblower to the Commission to avoid stiffer penalties.109
2. Internal Reporting as a Plus-Factor
“[P]articipation by the whistleblower in internal compliance systems”
is a plus-factor under the final rules that can increase the amount of the
award.110 The Dodd-Frank Act set forth three general criteria the SEC
must consider when determining the percentage of the whistleblower
award within the range of ten and thirty percent.111 The SEC has added
four additional criteria by which a whistleblower’s award percentage may
be increased, including “the extent to which, a whistleblower reported the
possible violation through effective internal whistleblower, legal, or
compliance procedures before reporting the violations to the

107
SEC Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c)(3)
(2012). Originally, the SEC proposed a ninety-day “look-back” period but the Business Roundtable
effectively argued companies needed more time to complete an internal investigation of potential
violations, particularly allegations that raise complex issues or occur overseas. Comment from
Alexander M. Cutler, Chair, Bus. Roundtable Corp. Leadership Initiative 8 (Dec. 17, 2010), available
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-142.pdf [hereinafter Comment from Cutler].
Partially conceding this point, the SEC added thirty days to the period of time in which an internal
whistleblower can wait before coming to the SEC. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c)(3).
108
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,319 (June 13,
2011).
109
See Baruch & Barr, supra note 104, at 41 (describing the incentives for a whistleblower by
internally reporting).
110
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,329, 34,360
(June 13, 2011).
111
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act specified three general
criteria the SEC must consider:

(I) the significance of the information provided by the whistleblower to the success
of the covered judicial or administrative action; (II) the degree of assistance
provided by the whistleblower and any legal representative of the
whistleblower . . .[;] (III) [law enforcement’s] programmatic interest . . . in deterring
violations of the securities laws by making awards to whistleblowers who provide
information that lead to the successful enforcement of such laws.
Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(c)(1)(b)(i) (2010). The statute also authorizes “such additional
relevant factors as the Commission may establish by rule or regulation.” Id.
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Commission.”
In addition, the SEC added three criteria to the final rules which may
decrease the amount of an award, including: (1) the culpability of the
whistleblower; (2) an unreasonable reporting delay by the whistleblower;
and (3) any interference with internal compliance and reporting systems by
the whistleblower.113 According to the SEC, the threat of decreasing the
amount of an award is intended to “minimize any incentive for
whistleblowers to conceal misconduct or to delay reporting it” and “to
increase the potential for a larger award.”114 However, the SEC readily
admits “a whistleblower has the greatest likelihood of receiving an award
if he reports misconduct to [the SEC] first.”115 Even the third criterion,
which addresses interference with internal reporting systems, applies only
in “cases where the whistleblower, while [voluntarily] interacting with his
entity’s internal compliance or reporting system, interferes with or
otherwise undermines the system’s integrity.”116 Therefore, these negative
factors are not designed to encourage internal reporting. At best, any
reduction penalty is meant to encourage prompt external reporting, not to
mandate internal reporting.
Unfortunately, the SEC has provided very little guidance on how it
will weigh either the positive or negative factors. It appears the SEC has
adopted a subjective effects-based approach to maximize prosecutorial
discretion “[d]epending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.”117
In fact, the SEC specifically states that a whistleblower who was especially
helpful to the SEC “could receive the maximum award [of 30%] regardless
of whether the whistleblower satisfied other factors such as participating in
internal compliance programs.”118 To further cement the SEC’s ultimate
discretion, the final rules make non-appealable both the final order
regarding the amount of an award as well as “any factual findings, legal
conclusions, policy judgments, or discretionary assessments” that the SEC

112

Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,330 (June 13,

2011).
113
SEC Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Rule, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.21F-6(b)(1)–(3) (2012); see also Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed.
Reg. 34,300, 34,308 (June 13, 2011) (“If a whistleblower took any steps to undermine the integrity of
[the employer’s internal compliance and reporting] systems or processes, we will consider that conduct
as a factor that may decrease the amount of any award.”).
114
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,350, 34,351
n.391 (June 13, 2011).
115
Id. at 34,351 n.391.
116
Id. at 34,358 n.443.
117
Id. at 34,331; see also id. (“[N]o attempt has been made to list the factors in order of
importance, weigh the relative importance of each factor, or suggest how much any factor should
increase or decrease the award percentage.”).
118
Id.
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3. Full-Credit Provision
Under the final rules, a whistleblower reporting original information to
the company internally will also get credit for all information that is
ultimately provided by the company to the SEC, regardless of whether the
information was included in the whistleblower’s report to the company or
obtained from an independent source.120 According to the SEC, “This
could create an opportunity for a whistleblower to obtain an award through
internal reporting where the whistleblower might not otherwise have
qualified for an award because the information was not sufficiently specific
and credible.”121 If more than one whistleblower contributes to a
company’s investigation and report, all the whistleblowers will have to
share the bounty because the aggregate amount of all whistleblower awards
for the same or related SEC action cannot exceed thirty percent of the
amount the SEC collects.122 This rule may actually exacerbate the number
of vague and meritless complaints that are filed internally while
simultaneously diverting the most serious reports of wrongdoing that may
merit the maximum bounty to the SEC.
B. Eligibility Exclusions
Under the final rules, employees with causal responsibility are
ineligible for a whistleblower award.123 A person can be said to be
causally responsible for a securities violation if his or her action or inaction
contributes to the violation. For example, if an employee bribes a foreign
government official to secure a substantial government contract then he or
she is causally responsible for the subsequent books and records violation.
The SEC’s final rules attempt to account for this sort of responsibility by
excluding from eligibility anyone who is convicted of a criminal violation
that is related to the SEC action that resulted from the tip.124
In addition, some employees with assignment responsibilities are not
eligible for whistleblower payments.125 A person is understood to have
assignment responsibility for some matter if it is part of his or her job
duties. The SEC partially accommodated this notion by excluding from
the bounty program certain individuals whose job function is to detect or
119

Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-13(a) (2012).
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-4(c)(1)–(3) (2012).
121
SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54.
122
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-5(c) (2012).
123
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(c)(3) (2012).
124
Id.
125
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,306 n.61 (June
13, 2011).
120
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investigate securities violations such as legal counsel, auditors, and internal
compliance personnel.126 These exclusions reflect the SEC’s determination
that at least some employees should not be permitted to “improperly use
their positions to claim a reward.”127 However, the SEC failed to provide
any accommodation for those companies that consider monitoring the
workplace for illegalities in the job of every employee.128
These eligibility exclusions, as promulgated in the final rules, are
considerably weaker than the exclusions originally proposed by the SEC.
For example, attorneys now qualify as whistleblowers where disclosures of
information learned in connection with the legal representation of a client
is otherwise waived or if disclosure is permissible pursuant to the SEC’s
attorney conduct rules, applicable state statutes, or local bar rules.129
Similarly, auditors and internal compliance personnel now qualify as
whistleblowers when they have a “reasonable basis to believe” that the
company is engaging in conduct that: (1) is “likely to cause substantial
injury to the financial interest or property” of the company or investors; or
(2) “will impede an investigation of the misconduct,” and at least 120 days
have elapsed since the whistleblower reported the information internally to
the company or became aware of information that was already known to
the company.130
C. Qualifying Information Definitions
The final rules also broaden the criteria for “information” that may be
reported directly to the SEC for a bounty to include: (1) information
regarding “possible” securities law violation that “has occurred, is
ongoing, or is about to occur”;131 (2) information that causes the SEC to
reopen an investigation or pursue a new line of inquiry in existing
investigations;132 and (3) information that is provided even after the
government begins an investigation if the information is deemed to have

126

Id.
SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54.
128
See, e.g., Comment from Susan Hackett, Senior Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Ass’n of
Corporate Counsel 2 (Dec. 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310126.pdf (insisting that “all employees are responsible for ensuring that the company operates within the
bounds of the law and ethics”).
129
See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,306 (June
13, 2011) (outlining comments that called for the exclusion of persons with employment duties to
perform from acting as a whistleblower).
130
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(v)
(2012).
131
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(1) (2012).
132
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,323–24 (June
13, 2011).
127
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“substantially contributed” to the success of the ongoing investigation.133
Critics argue these broad definitions of qualifying information will likely
open the SEC floodgates to complaints based on sheer conjecture and
speculation.134 Early reports from the SEC, however, suggest that the
quality of tips has not diminished.135 Regardless, the SEC needs to provide
whistleblowers with clearer guidance on what constitutes qualifying
information regarding possible violations.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW BOUNTY PROGRAM
The primary problem with the new SEC whistleblower bounty
program that this Article seeks to address is that it relies too much on
financial incentives. The stated goal of the SEC’s new bounty program is
to “incentivize those close to a fraud [or other securities violation] to come
forward and provide information to the Commission” so that the SEC can
bring more targeted public enforcement actions.136 Thus, the SEC’s
primary focus is on how best to increase tips leading to successful
prosecutions.137
During the rulemaking process, the SEC considered a mandatory
internal pre-reporting requirement where a whistleblower’s award
eligibility would be conditioned on his first making a report internally and
providing the company’s internal compliance function a reasonable period
of time to respond.138 However, the SEC rejected mandatory internal
133
Id. Only if the government requests information directly from the whistleblower (or anyone
representing the whistleblower) will the whistleblower be deemed ineligible for a bounty. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.21F-4(a)(2) (2012). In addition, while a request from any state authority would have
automatically disqualified an individual from collecting a bounty under the rules as originally
proposed, the final rules provide that only a request from a state attorney general or securities regulator
made in connection with an investigation, inspection, or examination would serve as a disqualification.
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(5) (2012).
134
See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,338 (June
13, 2011) (outlining the comments made regarding the procedures that attorneys should follow when
receiving tips that may not be based on fact).
135
See SEC Issues First Whistleblower Program Award, U.S. SEC (Aug. 21, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/2012/dig082112.htm (explaining that the early successes of the
whistleblower program is due to the quality of tips received).
136
SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54; see also Securities Whistleblower Incentives and
Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,359 (June 13, 2011) (stating that “the principle purpose of the
statute . . . is ensuring that the [SEC] receives quality tips” for their money); S. REP. NO. 111-176 at
110 (2010) (“The Whistleblower Program aims to motivate those with inside knowledge to come
forward and assist the Government to identify and prosecute persons who have violated the securities
laws.”).
137
SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54; see also Securities Whistleblower Incentives and
Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,359 (June 13, 2011) (“[T]he principal purpose of the statute,
which is ensuring that the Commission receives quality tips as a result of the financial incentive[s].”).
138
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,361 (June 13,
2011). The SEC also considered mandatory simultaneous reporting, under which the whistleblower’s
eligibility is conditioned upon a simultaneous report to internal compliance and the SEC. Id.
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whistleblowing, believing it could result in less external whistleblowing to
the SEC.139 Effectively, this relegates corporate whistleblowers to being a
mere instrumentality of the SEC. In fact, the SEC’s only concern since the
program was enacted, at least publicly, has been to alleviate concerns
about the quality of tips being diminished.140
Most of the legal scholarship on bounty programs has also tended to
focus on whether informants will “bring[] information about . . . fraud [and
other securities violations] to light.”141 The flow of information is one of
the “classic objective[s] of corporate governance”;142 however, it is not the
only objective. By focusing exclusively on the utilitarian function of
whistleblowing, even on something as valuable as whistleblowing’s
contribution to corporate transparency, we avoid the moral questions
surrounding whistleblowing altogether. Is it really the case that “[s]o long
as the information is sound, its recipient should be indifferent to the
informant’s motivations?”143 What if the informant is only coming
forward out of a desire to avoid punishment for himself? What if selfish or
evil motives tempt an informant to falsify or embellish the information?144
Doesn’t the difficulty of testing either the informant’s motives or the
information’s reliability make it all the more important to insist that he or
she demonstrate some good faith attempt to cooperate with the employer’s
compliance efforts before passing the information on to the SEC?
In this Part, I argue we must go beyond incentives and consider the
moral implications of whistleblowing. I am not arguing against using
financial incentives; rather, I am arguing against only using financial
incentives. Emphasizing only the power of large monetary rewards and
ignoring morality not only hampers a corporation’s ability to address
compliance problems, it can make those compliance problems worse. The
SEC should reject its “mere instrumentality” approach to whistleblowing
for at least three reasons: (1) it suppresses “real” whistleblowing; (2) it
increases retaliation against whistleblowers; and (3) it undermines
corporate compliance generally.

Additionally, the SEC considered “mandating that a whistleblower report internally within a specified
period of time after reporting to [the SEC], unless upon reviewing the submission [the SEC] direct[s]
the whistleblower not to report internally.” Id.
139
See id. (describing an approach based on avoiding implementation of a mandatory prereporting or a simultaneous reporting requirement because it would not provide any cost-benefit
advantage).
140
Press Release, U.S. SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Establish Whistleblower Program (May 25,
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-116.htm.
141
Rapp, False Claims, supra note 73, at 57.
142
Id. at 62 (internal quotation marks omitted).
143
Fisher et al., supra note 22, at 128.
144
See id. (outlining the possibility that some whistleblowers’ information may be unreliable due
to self-interested motives).
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A. Suppression of “Real” Whistleblowing
The first consequence of overemphasizing financial incentives is that it
suppresses “real” whistleblowing.145 It does so in at least two distinct
ways: (1) by discouraging internal whistleblowing; and (2) by over
incentivizing external whistleblowing.
1. Discouragement of Internal Whistleblowing
The subtle message of the new bounty program is that whistleblowers
are selfish and respond only to radical financial incentives. This implies
that selfish opportunistic behavior is the norm and, moreover, that it is
legally permissible. OBM research indicates that these sort of social cues
encourage employee opportunism—especially when they come from a
governmental authority—and become a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy.146
The SEC final rules repeat the same message that “greed is good” by not
mandating internal whistleblowing.147 This discourages internal
whistleblowing because it disconnects whistleblowing from any moral
obligation to first work internally with the company to see if there really is
a problem, or if it can be solved. In settling on this rule, the SEC is
signaling that most whistleblowers are motivated by monetary reward.
Empirical studies have shown that a person’s behavior is heavily
influenced by his or her expectation of how others will act in similar
circumstances.148 Thus, to the extent that a whistleblower thinks others are
not willing to risk retaliation by internally reporting a potential violation,
the whistleblower will be less willing to take the risk himself or herself.
The SEC should, instead, make internal whistleblowing the default
rule. This would promote the idea that whistleblowing can and should be
done for reasons other than financial gain. Despite the potential for
incurring costs in terms of time, money, social stigma, and a possible job
145
Comment from Allstate Ins. Co. et al. (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-189.pdf (“If personnel charged with responding to
internal reports of wrongdoing were in a position to benefit financially from disclosing such
information to the SEC, corporate compliance functions could soon grind to a halt. The very people
charged with orchestrating a company’s response could choose financial self-interest over corporate
responsibility.”); Comment from U.S. Chamber of Commerce Ctr. for Capital Mkts. Competitiveness
& U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform 2 (May 23, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-316.pdf (“By making . . . individuals eligible to serve
as whistleblowers and receive a substantial bounty, the Proposed Rules [which overemphasize financial
incentives] would put these professionals in the position of potentially deciding between self-interest
and the interest of their employer.”).
146
See STOUT, supra note 12, at 247–48 (2011) (arguing that unselfish behavior is encouraged by
the social cues of authoritative figures).
147
The quote, “greed is good” is from the fictional character Gordon Gekko in Oliver Stone’s
movie. WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1987).
148
See STOUT, supra note 12, at 248 (arguing that people who believe others are acting selfishly
will act selfishly themselves).
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loss, many employees are motivated to blow the whistle out of a sense of
justice, guilt, or simply because it is the right thing to do.149 A recent study
suggested whistleblowers are often emboldened (or at least sustained) by
personal religious beliefs, and are more credible as a result.150 The SEC
has argued, unconvincingly, that whistleblowers who are predisposed to
report internally will do so irrespective of the rule.151 However,
researchers in organizational behavior have found that the vast majority of
whistleblowers are, in fact, more likely to selfishly act like bounty hunters
when the proper authorities say such selfishness is appropriate or when
they believe others would act selfishly.152 In other words, corporate
compliance programs work in large part because a consensus arises that
bypassing hotlines violates the internal norm of cooperating.153 Therefore,
SEC rules are needed to define specific behavior that complies with the
cooperation norm.
2. Overincentivization of External Whistleblowing
Second, the bounty program also suppresses “real” whistleblowing by
over incentivizing external whistleblowing.
The most significant
difference between bounty hunters and “real” whistleblowers is not what
they are saying or even what they are seeking. It is what they are willing
to ignore; namely, bounty hunters will ignore opportunities to take
proactive measures to prevent or remedy compliance problems. The SEC
149
See Anthony Heyes & Sandeep Kapur, An Economic Model of Whistle-Blower Policy, 25 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 157, 159 (2009) (providing a short review of academic literature on sociology and
psychology and listing non-monetary motives for whistleblowing); Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., WhistleBlowers’ Experience in Fraud Litigation Against Pharmaceutical Companies, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1832, 1834 (2010) (listing the following as primary motivations for qui tam lawsuits: self-preservation,
justice, integrity, altruism, and public safety); see also NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER CTR., IMPACT OF QUI
TAM LAWS ON INTERNAL COMPLIANCE: A REPORT TO THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION 1, 6
(2010) [hereinafter NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR. REPORT], available at www.sec.gov/comments/s733-10/s73310.shtml (arguing that whistleblowers are not motivated by monetary gain such as
whistleblower rewards).
150
Daniel Martin, Whistle Blowing, Religiosity, Spirituality and Integrity: Understanding the
Impact of Social Dominance Orientation and Environmental Context, J. MORAL OCCUPATIONAL
PSYCHOL. at 10 (forthcoming Dec. 11, 2011) (citing several studies regarding the link between
whistleblowing and religiosity), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970970; see also Eamon Javers,
Religion, Not Money, Often Motivates Corporate Whistleblowers, CNBC Special Series “Bounty
Hunters,” Special Report (Feb. 12, 2011), available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/41494697/Religion_No
t_Money_Often_Motivates_Corporate_Whistleblowers (reporting that experts say religion is a
common trait among whistleblowers).
151
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,325, 34,361
(June 13, 2011).
152
See STOUT, supra note 12, at 119 (“[T]he vast majority will act selfishly when . . . [the]
authority says selfishness is appropriate, you believe others would act selfishly, and you believe
unselfish cooperation would provide only small benefits to other.”).
153
See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1253
(1999) (arguing that corporate actors are motivated by social norms and financial gain).
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assumes that the employee will always make the right choice regarding
whether to collaborate with his or her employer or not.154 So long as the
employee does not actively interfere with an internal investigation, SEC
Chairperson Mary Schapiro stated it is the SEC’s judgment that the
whistleblower “is in the best position to know which route is best to
pursue.”155 This, she argues, “strikes the correct balance . . . between
encouraging whistleblowers to pursue the route of internal compliance
when appropriate—while providing them the option of heading directly to
the SEC.”156
The SEC, however, grossly underestimates how much large bounties
will incentivize bounty hunters to ignore the norm of internal reporting and
to adopt a “wait-and-see” attitude. In 2010, according to NERA Economic
Consulting, the average SEC settlement was $18.3 million.157 In 2011, as
the SEC began implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, all median settlement
values increased except for the largest settlements against company
defendants.158 In the first half of 2012, the median settlement with
companies again rose.159 For example, the average settlement for a FCPA
violation rose significantly from $11.9 million in 2011 to $20.8 million in
2012.160 If this amount continues to climb, then whistleblowers can
reasonably expect the average bounty to be well within the range of $2
million to $5 million.161 While the SEC’s first whistleblower program
154
See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,331 n.274
(June 13, 2011) (stating that the effectiveness of the final rule relies on whistleblowers to determine
whether reporting internally would be appropriate or not).
155
SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54.
156
Id.
157
NERA Economic Consulting Releases 2010 SEC Settlement Trends Report, NERA ECON.
CONSULTING (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.nera.com/83_7105.htm. The average SEC settlement amount
increased from $10.9 million in 2009 and from $4.6 million in 2008. Id. However, the median
company settlement in 2010 fell to $799,000 as compared to $1 million in 2009. Id.
158
See ELAINE BUCKBERG, JAMES OVERDAHL & MAX GULKER, SEC SETTLEMENT TRENDS:
2H11 UPDATE 1 (2012), available at http://www.nera.com/67_7591.htm (finding that the median
settlement value increased for both companies and individuals, high-value settlements with individuals
“reached post-SOX highs,” but high-value settlements with companies declined); id. at 8 (“The average
settlement value for companies decreased from $18.5 million in [2010] to $7.4 million in [2011],
although more than half of this decrease is due to the $550 million settlement with Goldman Sachs,
which is the third-largest settlement since SOX. Excluding the Goldman settlement, the average
company settlement in 2010 was $12.3 million.”).
159
See JAMES A. OVERDAHL & ELAINE BUCKBERG, SEC SETTLEMENT TRENDS: 1H12 UPDATE 1
(2012), available at http://www.nera.com/67_7764.htm (finding that the median settlement value for
individuals “continued to follow the upward path observed since [2010]” but the median settlement
value for companies “declined after reaching a record value in [2011]”); see also id. at 7 (finding that
the the only notable exception to the upward trend for average values of settlements with companies
was for Ponzi schemes, where the average decreased from $4.8 million to $1.1 million).
160
Id. at 7.
161
This is just an estimate. The SEC’s final rules implementing the Section 21F whistleblower
bounty program did not go into effect until August 12, 2011, and the SEC’s fiscal year ended
September 30, 2011. U.S. SEC, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM
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award was only $50,000, more awards are expected in the near future.163
When the bounty hunter and his or her attorney stand to gain such a sizable
amount of money, some of them will inevitably choose to lie, remain
silent, or at a minimum, drag their feet, if it will mean the difference
between a payout and no payout.164 This was a key concern for AT&T in
their comments to the proposed rules.165 The telecommunications giant,
which employs over 266,000 employees, convincingly argued that plaintiff
attorneys stand to gain considerable profit from encouraging their clients to
keep silent longer.166
The SEC claims that its final rules “should mitigate any diversion
effect” by providing that an internal report “can increase both the
probability and the magnitude of a potential recovery.”167 According to the
SEC, reporting internally increases the probability of an award because it
creates “two paths to a recovery—[an SEC] investigation, or an internal
corporate investigation.”168 The SEC further maintains reporting internally
increases the magnitude of a potential award because the award criteria
include a “plus-factor for participation in an entity’s internal compliance
procedures.”169
However, both of the SEC’s arguments fail to account for the
likelihood that a company that first receives an internal report will take
3, 5 (2011) [hereinafter SEC ANNUAL REPORT], available at www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/whistlebl
ower-annual-report-2011.pdf. The SEC did not have sufficient time to process any applications during
fiscal year 2011. Id. at 8. Therefore, it is still too early to know for sure.
162
See SEC Issues First Whistleblower Program Award, U.S. SEC (Aug. 21, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/2012/2012-162.htm (explaining that the award represents the full
thirty percent of the $150,000 collected so by on a court order of more than $1 million in sanctions).
163
See SEC Whistleblowers Waiting for Big Payouts as Rumors of First Award Mount,
HUFFINGTON
POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/31/sec-whistleblower-rewardpayout_n_1560044.html (May 31, 2012, 5:41 PM) (“Rumors are running wild that the first payout will
come any day now.”). But see Paul Tharp, SEC Set to Hand out up to $452 Million to Whistleblowers,
N.Y. POST, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/whistleblower_gold_EgZdzyFPP8vZ8IraUSMvx
O (July 10, 2012, 4:37 PM) (“SEC officials would not say when the first awards under the program
would be made.”).
164
See Stefan Rützel, Snitching for the Common Good: In Search of a Response to the Legal
Problems Posed by Environmental Whistleblowing, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 44 (1995)
(arguing that financial rewards are inappropriate because they increase the danger of frivolous
complaints, the costs offset any potential savings, and they may have been unnecessary).
165
Comment from Wayne Watts, Senior Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, AT&T 1 (Dec.10,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-102.pdf [hereinafter Comment
from Watts] (emphasizing that whistleblowers should not be rewarded who “engage in, perpetuate, or
fail to take action to stop internal wrongdoing”).
166
Id.; Global 500 Rankings, CNNMONEY.COM,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2011/snapshots/2756.html (last visited Sept. 3,
2012).
167
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,360 (June 13,
2011).
168
Id.
169
Id.
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lawful steps to reduce or avoid the monetary sanctions.
Under current
SEC guidelines, a monetary penalty will be lower if a company thoroughly
investigates, takes remedial action and then promptly self-reports than if
the SEC initiates the contact with the company.171 Therefore, internal
whistleblowers stand to gain less than external whistleblowers who go
directly to the SEC without affording the company the opportunity to
mitigate the damage. The SEC can use a “plus-factor” to adjust the award
upward where the internal reporting potentially resulted in a lower
monetary sanction; however, the SEC makes no guarantee that the higher
percentage given to internal whistleblowers will be enough to make up the
difference. Moreover, in cases where a company’s prompt remedial action
avoids sanctions altogether or keeps the sanctions under the million-dollar
threshold, there would be no bounty awards because a greater percentage
of zero is still zero. Therefore, it seems certain that no matter how you
calculate it, there will be fewer and less timely internal whistleblowings
once bounty hunters and their attorneys do the math.172
In the end, the message that the SEC is sending is that there is nothing
wrong with bypassing the internal reporting system—that whistleblowing
is valued not for its own sake, but only as an instrumentality. Such a
message will significantly diminish the force of the corporate norm of
internal reporting. Just as the FCPA and SOX supported strong corporate
compliance cultures by throwing the force of law behind the norm, the
Dodd-Frank Act reduces the moral force of whistleblowing by
withdrawing support for one of its principal norms.
B. Increase of Retaliation
The second major consequence of the bounty program is it will likely
increase retaliation against corporate whistleblowers. One of the primary
justifications given for implementing the bounty program was that radical
financial incentives are needed to help employees overcome their fear of
retaliation, but this is a red herring. It is certainly true that retaliation, as
170
Comment from Palmina L. Fava, Paul, Hasting, Janofsky & Walker LLP 1 (Dec. 16, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-137.pdf (arguing that the financial
incentives offered in the whistleblower program can create “a conflict of interest between the
company’s desire to cooperate with the government in an effort to earn preferred treatment and a
possible reduction in penalties, and the whistleblower’s possible incentive to maximize the company’s
exposure and thus extract a larger personal pay-day”).
171
SEC Whistleblower Rules Encourage Internal Investigations, MILBANK LITIG. (June 3, 2011),
http://www.milbank.com/images/content/5/4/5447.pdf (asserting that companies that self-report
violations will be rewarded by the SEC for their cooperation).
172
The SEC’s 2012 Annual Whistleblower Report, which will provide the first actual data on
payouts, is not expected to be released until late 2012. See SEC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 161, at
1–2 (stating that the Commission’s Office of the Whistleblower is required to report annually at the end
of the fiscal year, which ends in September).
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well as other social and psychological factors, can have a chilling effect on
certain whistleblowers.173 However, this is best remedied by increasing
legal protection from retaliation, not by increasing non-mutual financial
interests. In fact, if anything, allowing employees to blindside their
employers by externally reporting potential securities law violations will
increase, rather than decrease, retaliation by increasing intrafirm
adversarialism.
The term “adversarialism” is generally used to describe a preexisting
case or controversy between opposing parties.174 In the context of
corporate whistleblowing, adversarialism has come to have a double
meaning. First, it refers to the adversarialism between corporations and the
SEC. The SEC assumes that modern corporations are profit driven and
equates this with greed.175 Greed is now thought to be, in the words of
Judge Easterbrook, “the engine that propels a market economy.”176 When
173
See, e.g., Comment from Julie Grohovsky, Wu, Grohovsky & Whipple et al. 4 (Dec. 16, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310.shtml (arguing that if whistleblowers were
required to report internally they would likely remain silent); see also Pamela H. Bucy, Information as
a Commodity in the Regulatory World, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 905, 950 (2002) (summarizing statistics about
the retaliation and effects of whistleblowing on whistleblowers); Kesselheim et al., supra note 149, at
1834 (stating that whistleblowers who complained internally had their complaints dismissed, and that
the whistleblowers feared losing their jobs); Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 15, at 95–96 (stating
that whistleblowing imposes psychological burdens on the potential whistleblower, including the fear
of being blacklisted from future employers and social ostracism); Luigi Zingales, Want to Stop
Corporate Fraud? Pay Off Those Whistle-Blowers, WASH. POST (January 18, 2004), at B2 (arguing
that whistleblowers are considered spies and ostracized by there employers); Comment from Eric
Dixon, Eric Dixon LLC 2 (Dec. 19, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-3310/s73310-221.pdf (“The identification of whistleblowers exposes them to serious risk, including
physical harm to them and their families, professional or career reprisals and community ostracization.
Whistleblowers may also face retaliation from alleged wrongdoers or their associates, including civil
suits.”).
174
MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 19 (11th ed. 2005) (defining “adversarial”
as “relating to, or characteristic of an adversary or adversary procedures,” and “adversary” as “having
or involving antagonistic parties or opposing interests”).
175
See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Relevance of Corporate Theory to Corporate and Economic
Development: Comment on the Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality
Theories, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1489, 1491, 1494 (2006) (asserting that corporations historically
existed to further the common good while corporate charters focused more on the protection of the
public interest than on the financial interests of its corporate shareholders, but that this so-called “grant
theory” died out after the Civil War because of the enactment of general incorporation laws first in
New Jersey and later in Delaware, which eventually lead to a widespread race to the bottom among all
of the states).
176
Wilkow v. Forbes, Inc., 241 F.3d 552, 557 (7th Cir. 2001). Judge Easterbrook believes that
corporations are, by design, solely profit driven and incapable of assuming moral responsibilities; this
view is also known as contractarianism. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 4 (1991). Contractarians argue against any corporate law
rules that mandate or inhibit particular governance relationships—except perhaps to counteract market
failure. See id. at 1 (stating that corporate managers use their control to exploit investors and
consumers); see also JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND
POWER 69 (2004) (arguing that corporations are programmed to exploit others for profit); David K.
Millon, New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians and the Crisis in
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it comes to compliance, the SEC further assumes this profit motive is
incompatible with the legal compliance goals of a regulator like the SEC.
Instead, companies are said to be driven by the “invisible hand” of selfinterest.177 According to the SEC, when a corporation receives an internal
report of wrongdoing, it will most likely retaliate against the
whistleblower, cover-up the illegality, or both.178
Second, the SEC has introduced adversarialism into the relationship
between corporations and their employees.179 The agency assumes that
whistleblowers are less protected when they are reporting internally than
when reporting externally; therefore, the final rules permit whistleblowers
to bypass the internal reporting system altogether. This fosters intrafirm
adversarialism between the company and its employees where none
previously existed, which, in turn, only increases retaliation.180
To try to reduce the risk of increased retaliation, the SEC has reserved
the right not to take any action that might reveal the whistleblower’s
identity until it actually files the enforcement action.181 The SEC may,
“upon receiving a whistleblower complaint, contact a company, describe
the nature of the allegations, and give the company an opportunity to
investigate the matter and report back,” but not disclose the informant’s
identity.182 In determining what information, if any, to give to a company,
the SEC “may consider a number of factors, including, but not limited
to . . . the nature of the alleged conduct, the level at which the conduct
allegedly occurred, and the company’s existing culture related to corporate
governance.”183
Keeping the whistleblower’s identity confidential,
Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1373, 1377–78 n.19 (1993) (asserting that Judge
Easterbrook is a leading proponent of contractarianism and he would advocate a substantial body of
rules designed to counteract market failure).
177
See 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 456 (R. H. Campbell et al. eds., Liberty Press 1981) (1976) (concluding that “[b]y pursuing
his own interest [Economic Man] frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he
really intends to promote it”).
178
See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,361 (June 13,
2011) (citing retaliation and cover-ups as reasons for not mandating internal reporting); see also
Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 319, 374 (2005) (stating that potential whistleblowers are often financially dependent on the
corporation and subject to their reprisals).
179
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,300–01 (June 13,
2011) (stating that the final rule does not require a whistleblower to report internally first).
180
See Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Whistle-Blowing: Myth and Reality, 22 J. MGMT. 507,
509 (1996) (citing two 1995 studies concluding that external whistleblowers may be more likely to
suffer retaliation than internal whistleblowers).
181
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21F(h)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2) (2010) (providing that
the SEC “shall not disclose any information, including information provided by a whistleblower to the
Commission, which could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower”).
182
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,323 (June 13,
2011).
183
Id. at 34,323 n.197.
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however, will hamper the corporation’s ability to fully respond to the
allegations. Furthermore, anonymous complaints are less reliable than
reports from known informants.184
The solutions to whistleblower retaliation are more comprehensive
protections and legal remedies, not simply more financial incentives on the
front end. There are several gaps in the existing anti-retaliation laws that
Congress should immediately address if it is serious about achieving
justice for corporate whistleblowers.185 While the private enforcement
efforts of whistleblowers clearly have a role to play in corporate
governance, the key is timing. Introducing adversarialism too early in the
compliance process will supplant internal corporate compliance efforts
with conventional command-and-control regulations that, as discussed
next, have proven ineffective and only lead to more corporate opportunism.
C. Undermining of Corporate Compliance
The third consequence of the bounty program is it undermines a
corporation’s ability to create an effective compliance culture from the
inside out. Over the last decade, the SEC has repeatedly acknowledged
that internal compliance programs are vital to the prevention and detection
of securities violations.186 After the Enron scandal, then SEC Chairman,
William Donaldson, contended that a company’s single most important
asset is its “moral DNA.”187 He strongly advocated establishing “a culture
that puts ethics and accountability first” and that avoids the “common trap
of mere compliance.”188 As recently as last year, the SEC affirmed that
“internal reporting to effective compliance programs can provide valuable
assistance to [the SEC’s] own enforcement efforts.”189 The new bounty
184
See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000) (affirming that “anonymous tips . . . are
generally less reliable than tips from known informants and can form the basis for reasonable suspicion
only if accompanied by specific indicia of reliability” in the appeal of a criminal case).
185
In another article, I plan to discuss the implications of the principle of restorative justice for
whistleblowers. At a minimum, restorative justice requires applying the whistleblower laws
extraterritorially, granting whistleblowers a broader private right of action, and creating a
comprehensive whistleblower compensation fund to cover non-pecuniary damages suffered as a result
of more subtle forms of retaliation. See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61, 71 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding
that provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley do not extend to private company employees); William Villanueva
v. Core Labs. NV, No. 09-108, 2011 WL 6981989, at *6–8 (DOL Adm. Rev. Bd. Dec. 22, 2011)
(discussing the lack of statutory language governing extraterritorial disclosures); Schichor, supra note
14, at 292–95 (arguing that non-pecuniary damages are necessary to protect against employer
retaliation).
186
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,323 (June 13,
2011).
187
William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. SEC, Remarks Before the Economic Club of New
York (May 8, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch050803whd.htm.
188
Id.
189
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,360 (June 13,
2011).
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program, however, threatens to undermine a corporation’s efforts to
regulate itself.
1. Ignoring of Regulatory Standards
The SEC’s new bounty program ignores pre-existing regulatory
standards that mandate internal reporting systems. The legal requirement
that corporations have adequate systems of internal controls dates back to
1977, when Congress amended the federal securities laws with the
enactment of the FCPA, and 2002, when Congress passed SOX and
ushered in the modern self-regulation approach to corporate regulation.190
For example, SOX requires that a company’s annual report must include a
statement of the management’s responsibility over internal controls and
reporting; a statement on the framework used to evaluate those controls
over the past year; management’s assessments of the effectiveness of these
controls over the past year, with an identification of any material
weaknesses; and a statement that the issuer’s auditors have attested to
management’s assessment of internal controls.191 SOX also required the
SEC to issue rules to require issuers to disclose whether they have codes of
ethics applicable to senior financial officers.192 Accordingly, the SEC
passed implementing rules requiring issuers to disclose in their annual
reports whether the company has adopted a code of ethics and to file a
copy with the SEC.193 Although the SEC rules do not specify the exact
details that must be included in a code of ethics, one of the matters which
is most often addressed in a code of ethics is the prompt internal reporting
of code violations.
The SEC has also promoted internal compliance programs through the
threat of increased liability. Shortly before the enactment of SOX, for
example, the SEC issued the so-called Seaboard Report that announced

190
See Carl Pacini, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Taking a Bite out of Bribery in
International Business Transactions, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 545, 576 (2012) (explaining that
the FCPA requires internal controls, though it does not define them); SEC Opening Statement, supra
note 54 (acknowledging that SOX “made great strides in creating whistleblower protections and
requiring internal reporting systems at public companies”). State law also now emphasizes the need for
directors of publicly traded companies to be concerned about internal control systems in fulfilling their
duty of care responsibilities. See also In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–70
(Del. Ch. 1996) (explaining company’s duties to act in good faith, monitor its own business decisions,
and keep their company compliant with all laws).
191
Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certification of
Disclosure in Exchange Report Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636, 36,642 (June 8, 2003).
192
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 406, 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2006).
193
17 C.F.R. § 229.406 (2012); see also Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5,110, 5,117–20 (Jan. 31, 2003) (explaining the disclosures
required and how they are to be made).
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thirteen factors the SEC considers when bringing enforcement actions.194
The second factor in the Seaboard Report asks whether the company had
an internal compliance program.195 Other factors ask about the corporate
culture and the tone at the top,196 how the company monitors compliance,
investigates reports of misconduct and corrects any misconduct
discovered,197 and whether the organization learned from the misconduct
by modifying its compliance program to better deter and prevent similar
misconduct in the future.198
Since then, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were revised to reflect
the need for more effective and robust internal compliance systems.199 A
corporation may generally be held criminally liable for securities law
violations that are (1) connected to and committed in the course of
employment, (2) for the benefit of the corporation, and (3) with the
authorization or acquiescence of the corporation.200 However, mitigating
factors under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines include the presence of
“an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law” by corporate
agents.201 Thus, while corporations are required by law to establish an
194
Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions,
Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, 2001 WL 1301408 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Seaboard Report],
available at www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm. The report is referred to as the
“Seaboard Report” because the report summarizes why the SEC would not take enforcement action
against a parent company—Seaboard Corporation—for accounting misconduct at one of its divisions
after the parent company took prompt remedial action and fully cooperated with the SEC. Compliance
101—The Seaboard Report, CORP. COMPLIANCE PROF. BLOG (July 11, 2005),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/compliance_prof/2005/07/compliance_101__1.htm.
195
Seaboard Report, supra note 194 (“What compliance procedures were in place to prevent the
misconduct now uncovered? Why did those procedures fail to stop or inhibit the wrongful conduct?”).
The Seaboard Report does not, however, discuss how to evaluate the effectiveness of a compliance
program.
196
Id. (asking, under Factor 1, whether the misconduct “result[ed] from inadvertence, honest,
mistake, simple negligence, reckless or deliberate indifference to indicia or wrongful conduct, willful
misconduct or unadorned venality” and whether the company’s auditors were mislead, and asking,
under Factor 3, where the misconduct occurred in the organization and whether senior management
turned a blind eye to the misconduct).
197
Id. (providing, in Factors 4–10, the questions to ask regarding the length of the misconduct, the
harm caused by the misconduct, how the misconduct was discovered and by whom, the effective
response time, the steps taken by the company to stop the misconduct, the company’s cooperation, and
its commitment to finding the truth).
198
Id. (“What assurances are there that the conduct is unlikely to recur? Did the company adopt
and ensure enforcement of new and more effective internal controls and procedures designed to prevent
a recurrence of the misconduct? Did the company provide our staff with sufficient information for it to
evaluate the company’s measures to correct the situation and ensure that the conduct does not recur?”).
199
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2011) (requiring due diligence for
the prevention of misconduct, and promotion of a culture of compliance).
200
10 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 4942 (rev. vol. 2010).
201
See Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34 ARIZ.
L. REV. 743, 784 (1992). The other potential mitigating factor is the extent of the corporation’s
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internal reporting system, the new bounty program allows and even
incentivizes employees to disregard these internal compliance systems.
Without employee participation, however, these corporate systems cannot
be expected to effectively prevent or detect violations of the law.202
2. Ignoring Best Practices
The SEC’s new bounty program also ignores accepted “best practices”
established by experts in the field of corporate compliance. Most public
companies have spent considerable time and effort over the last couple of
decades building state-of-the-art internal reporting and compliance
programs. In most cases, these compliance efforts are more than just
cosmetic.203 The keystone of these programs is the employees in the field
that have access to first-hand information and are in the best position to
detect and prevent potential securities violations. They are supported by a
wide range of personnel tasked with following up on employee complaints,
including internal auditors, human resources directors, in-house counsel
specializing in regulatory affairs and compliance officers.204
Most public companies have implemented several alternative internal
reporting mechanisms including: (1) an open door policy which allows
reporting potential violations or complaints to a supervisor, or when the
supervisor is implicated in the alleged misconduct, allows bypassing the
chain-of-command and reporting suspected violations or complaints
directly to senior management or the compliance office;205 (2) a toll-free
whistleblower tip hotline;206 and, in many cases, (3) an ombudsmen
cooperation with law enforcement officials. Id. Aggravating factors considered in assessing a
corporation’s culpability include: “(1) the involvement in or tolerance of criminal activity by ‘high
level’ or ‘substantial authority’ personnel; (2) a recent history of similar misconduct [by the
corporation]; (3) violation of a judicial order or condition of probation; and (4) [corporation’s]
obstruction of justice.” Id.
202
See SEC Whistleblower Rules Encourage Internal Investigations, MILBANK LITIG. (June 3,
2011), http://www.millbank.com/images/content/5/4/5447.pdf (examining the role of the employee
whistleblower and the new rules surrounding reporting).
203
But see Kimberly Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance,
81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491 (2003) (arguing that “a growing body of evidence indicates that internal
compliance structures do not deter prohibited conduct within firms, and may largely serve a windowdressing function that provides both market legitimacy and reduced legal liability”).
204
Robert Lupone, Corporate Compliance: The Role of Company Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 491, 526 (2008).
205
Nat’l Council of Nonprofit Ass’n, Whistleblower Policy-Sample, ASHP.ORG,
http://www.ashp.org/s_ashp/docs/files/about/Affiliate_Whistleblower_Sample.pdf (last visited Sept.
25, 2012).
206
See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., UNITED STATES: PHASE 3 REPORT ON THE APPLICATION
OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 2009 REVISED RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 18 (2010) [hereinafter ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV.],
available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-
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208

program.
Along with other best practices, these internal reporting
mechanisms encourage a culture of compliance transparency that takes
compliance seriously and often spurs companies to achieve norms that are
actually better than what the law requires.209 By allowing employees to
bypass these mechanisms altogether, the new bounty program will not only
render these internal reporting mechanisms useless, but it will promote the
very culture of opportunism that these compliance systems are intended to
combat.
As currently implemented, the bounty program jeopardizes the ability
of corporations to maintain a strong compliance culture. As discussed
earlier, the SEC leaves it up to the employee to decide whether the
company has an effective internal reporting system or not.210 If in the
employee’s opinion, the employer’s reporting system does not pass muster,
then the employee is free to ignore it and proceed directly to the SEC. 211
briberyconvention/46213841.pdf (highlighting the use of U.S. companies’ whistleblower tip hotlines);
see also Comment from Cutler, supra note 107, at 4 (explaining the “value of the hotline for reporting
unethical activities and as a means for reducing corporate culpability”).
207
See Lobel, supra note 18, at 497 (“Employees are more likely to use internal procedures when
the procedures are formally established and the corporation asserts its commitment to a fair process.
Thus, many companies have created an ombudsman position within the firm . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
An ombudsman is a quasi-independent person within the corporation who specializes in hearing
complaints, managing conflicts, and monitoring legal compliance. Id.; see also Martin Lipton, SEC
Adopts New Rules to Encourage Whistleblowers, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN.
REG. (June 30, 2011, 9:50 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/06/30/sec-adopts-newrules-to-encourage-whistleblowers/ (explaining the measures used by public companies to “enhance the
effectiveness of their internal compliance systems” and acknowledging the integral nature of such
measures).
208
For a list of other related best practices such as cultivating a tone at the top with
communications from the CEO emphasizing the importance of legal compliance and ethics, adopting
codes of conduct, conducting ongoing ethics and compliance training and education for employees,
investigation reports of misconduct promptly and thoroughly, and taking appropriate remedial action,
see ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 206, at 46–47. See also Comment from Cutler, supra
note 107, at 4 (describing procedures of compliance in place to prevent securities law violations);
Comment from Susan Hackett, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Ass’n of Corp. Counsel 3 (Dec.
17, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-144.pdf (suggesting further
provisions, such as barring short sellers from “obtaining a second bite at the apple through the
whistleblower process,” and ensuring that prospective whistleblowers make timely reports of
misconduct, to prevent securities fraud stemming from the new whistleblower policies).
209
See Lori A. Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations U.S. SEC,
Speech by SEC Staff: The Culture of Compliance at Spring Compliance Conference: National
Regulatory Services (Apr. 23, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042303lar.htm
(“[I]t’s not enough to have policies. It’s not enough to have procedures. It’s not enough to have good
intentions. All of these can help. But to be successful, compliance must be an embedded part of your
firm’s culture.”).
210
See SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54 (discussing the balance reached between
encouraging internal compliance and allowing the whistleblower to bypass that option if necessary
because “it is the whistleblower who is in the best position to know which route is best to pursue”).
211
See id. (stating that the whistleblower has the option of reporting internally or going directly to
the SEC).
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The SEC’s final rules effectively prevent corporations from requiring their
employees to follow their own internal policies and procedures. A recent
report by Littler Mendelson found that 96% of executives surveyed were
either moderately or very concerned about potential whistleblower claims
against their companies in light of the new program.212
Admittedly, most companies have not yet noticed much of an impact
on their internal compliance programs.213 This may be because
whistleblowers and their attorneys are still learning how to run the gantlet.
In addition, many corporations have taken counter measures to increase
employee training on how to report wrongdoing and to increase
management training on how to respond to such reports.214 In a recent
survey conducted by the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics and
its affiliated Health Care Compliance Association, three-quarters of
respondents reported increasing communication to employees on reporting
wrongdoing since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.215 In addition, 66%
of survey respondents (72% of respondents from publicly traded
companies) reported an expected increase in management communication
about handling allegations of wrongdoing.216 This significant increase in
in-house compliance training may help to buoy internal whistleblowing for
the time being.217 If so, we are not likely to see the negative effects of the
bounty program on corporate culture until a critical mass or tipping point is
reached; however, at that point it may be too late to do anything about it.
The SEC insists that the quality of tips has not been diminished, and
therefore, any attempt now by Congress to fix it would be premature.
However, this pragmatic approach to policy making ignores how law
shapes culture, and culture shapes behavior.218 Presently, no substantial
212
LITTLER MENDELSON, WHISTLEBLOWER SURVEY 1 (2011), available at http://www.littler.co
m/files/press/related-files/Littler-Whistleblower-Survey-Nov-2011.pdf.
213
See NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR. REPORT, supra note 149, at 5 (“The existence of a . . .
whistleblower reward program has no impact on the willingness of employees to internally report
potential violations of law, or to work with their employer to resolve compliance issues.”).
214
Allan Dinkoff, Corporate Compliance Programs After Dodd-Frank, WEIL.COM 13–16 (Oct.
2011), http://weil.com/files/upload/Corporate_Compliance_Post_Dodd_Frank_AELC_Oct.11.pdf
(discussing the different new initiatives that companies can take to ensure effective compliance).
215
HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE ASS’N & SOC’Y OF CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS, DODD-FRANK:
BIG HEADLINES, NOT-SO-BIG IMPACT 4
(2011),
available
at
http://www.hccainfo.org/Resources/View/ArticleId/195/Survey-by-SCCE-and-HCCA-Reveals-Little-Impact-of-DoddFrank-Act.aspx.
216
Id. at 5.
217
Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model, supra note 71, at 1142–43 (“A disclosure
channel also harmonizes with a whistleblower’s tendency to report misconduct internally . . . by this
sense of loyalty. . . . [Internal reporting] fits well with the psyche of the American employee, whose
sense of loyalty to the organization keeps her from reporting misconduct externally, but who may
report internally if encouraged by the organization.” (footnotes omitted)).
218
For example, at one time bribery was considered business as usual in many parts of the world.
However, the FCPA led to similar anti-bribery laws being established around the world. Today, nearly
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bounties have been paid out.
But even one or two sizable awards to the
wrong people may be able to radically change the compliance culture in
many corporations by successfully allying fears of any consequences for
departing from the norm of internal reporting.
Ironically, “evil” corporations will welcome employees bypassing
internal reporting because it will lower their compliance costs. Fewer
complaints mean fewer investigations. Moreover, the SEC can target only
a small fraction of the over 15,000 public companies; therefore, there is
little increased risk of public enforcement. In anticipation of this, the SEC
indicated early on that it plans on forwarding whistleblower tips to the
employer for an early response.220 In that case, the only difference will be
that the SEC will introduce adversarialism into the process prematurely.
This will cause internal investigators to go into defense mode. In doing so,
the SEC will discourage in-house compliance personnel and lawyers from
sharing information with employees, learning from employees, or
otherwise involving employees in mutually beneficial problemsolving
efforts.
3. Ignoring Public Enforcement Limitations
Despite corporations’ best efforts, most scholars recognize the need for
some threat of prosecution. A growing body of research confirms the need
to maintain a significant background threat of external enforcement. 221 In
general, the law promotes self-regulation by presupposing adversarialism,
and then rewarding individual companies who demonstrate exceptional
cooperation with a less adversarial or less punitive regime. This is
generally known as the “carrot and stick” approach.222 Relying heavily on
this traditional approach, the SEC has taken the position that internal
compliance programs cannot serve as complete substitutes for the
every country prohibits bribery of government officials. Over a dozen international anti-bribery
conventions have been signed and/or ratified by over 200 countries. The result is bribery is no longer
generally acceptable in international business. See Vega, supra note 40, at 391 (arguing that the
prohibition against foreign bribery has become customary international law).
219
But see S.E.C. Makes First Bounty Award to Dodd-Frank Act Whistleblower, JACKSON LEWIS
LLP (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4178 (announcing that the
first and only bounty paid out to date was $50,000).
220
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,323 (June 13, 2011).
221
See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1992) (discussing how regulators influence
not only through actual prosecution but public threat of prosecution). See also John W. Maxwell, SelfRegulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism, 43 J. L. &
ECON. 583, 603 (2000) (positing that “firms engage in more self-regulation when they perceive a
greater threat of government regulation”).
222
Kara Blanco & Rebecca E. Whitacre, The Carrot and Stick Approach: In Terrorem Clauses in
Texas Jurisprudence, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1127, 1128–29 (noting that the “stick” in this type of
approach is “a threatened punishment, which will be used if the carrot [or potential reward] is not
sufficient” to elicit compliance).
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government’s obligation to identify and remedy securities law
violations.223 In addition to implementing the new bounty program, the
SEC has recently undergone a major revamping and is now doubling down
on its enforcement efforts.224
While the SEC must do everything it can to ensure compliance with
corporate laws, it must also recognize that external whistleblowing will not
be enough. Increasing the number of tips reported to the SEC will not by
itself reduce securities law violations for several reasons. First, the SEC
does not have the resources to engage in the kind of large-scale, ongoing
interventions needed to create a permanent solution using the traditional
command-and-control approach.225 Although the Dodd-Frank Act reflects
a broad congressional mandate, the agency did not receive any additional
funding. Given its limited resources, it is critical that the SEC find a way
to give whistleblowers a role in the compliance process without
abandoning the modern experiment in self-regulation.
Second, the SEC also has a checkered history when it comes to taking
prompt corrective action. For example, several members of Congress
criticized the SEC for failing to promptly act against firms involved in the
financial crisis despite being put on notice by several early indicators. 226
Others also fault the SEC, which ignored a 1999 letter accusing Bernard
Madoff of conducting a massive Ponzi scheme, for the resulting debacle on
Wall Street.227
Finally, there is little evidence that civil and criminal penalties and
settlements can address the more systemic problems in corporate
223
Securities Whistleblowers Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,000, 34,324 (June 13,
2011) (noting that although the SEC “believe[s] that internal compliance programs play an important
role” in the identification of securities law violations, such programs “are not substitutes for rigorous
law enforcement”).
224
See The Securities and Exchange Commission Post-Madoff Reforms, U.S. SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/secpostmadoffreforms.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2012) (describing the
SEC’s revamping of its policies and procedures and systems for handling whistleblower complaints
and tips).
225
David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings: A New
Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307, 310–11 (2008). The traditional approach
gives corporations substantive rules and then relies on top-down enforcement by agencies. Id. at 311
(noting the deficiencies in such an approach, as it can lead to “cosmetic compliance programs or
calculated cooperation with the government”).
226
Edward Wyatt, SEC Is Pursuing More Inquiries Tied to the Financial Crisis, Chairwoman
Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2010, at B2 (stating that the SEC drew criticism from Congress, as well as
investor groups, for “a lack of prominent enforcement cases against firms that played a major role in
the financial crisis, which cost individual and institutional investors billions of dollars in losses”).
227
See Binyamin Appelbaum & David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Didn’t Act on Madoff Tips, WASH.
POST, Dec. 16, 2008, at D1 (“The SEC had the authority to investigate Madoff’s investment business,
which managed billions of dollars . . . . Financial analysts raised concerns about Madoff’s practices
repeatedly over the past decade, including a 1999 letter to the SEC that accused Madoff of running a
Ponzi scheme. But the agency did not conduct even a routine examination of the investment business
until [December 2008].”).
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governance.
The SEC has dramatically increased the number of civil
and criminal public enforcement actions against corporations for the last
several years, resulting in record fines and onerous settlement agreements.
And despite these aggressive enforcement efforts, the level of white-collar
crime and fraud is still increasing.229 If compliance were based solely on
the threat of liability, we would expect the level of compliance to have
gone up, but in fact it has gone down significantly over this time period.230
Thus, even if the SEC’s new whistleblower bounty program results in
significantly more enforcement actions, monetary fines are unlikely to
effect the desired change in corporate compliance.231
Given the inherent limitations of public enforcement efforts, there are
two important questions. First, what are the long-term negative effects of
the bounty program on corporate compliance? Second, what is its likely
effect on the moral legitimacy of corporate whistleblowers? Common
sense tells us the solution to corporate opportunism cannot be a program
that encourages employee opportunism. What is needed is a coherent
regulatory philosophy to guide regulators as to when to require internal
whistleblowing and when to encourage external whistleblowing to
maximize corporate self-regulation without sacrificing the whistleblower’s
morality.
V. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MORAL WHISTLEBLOWING
Corporate whistleblowing must be shaped. Moral principles, not just
economic interests, should inform this reshaping. Cultivating a strong
moral basis for whistleblowing can overcome transactional costs and other
purely economic obstacles that a “mere instrumentality” approach to
whistleblowing cannot;232 however, corporate whistleblowing is first and
228
See Hess & Ford, supra note 225, at 310–11 (discussing how prosecutors and enforcers do not
have adequate resources nor a mandate to engage in effective corporate governance).
229
See, e.g., ETHICS RESEARCH CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY: AN INSIDE VIEW OF
PRIVATE SECTOR ETHICS v (2007), available at http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/The_2007_National_Bu
siness_Ethics_Survey.pdf (concluding that “[e]thical misconduct in general is very high and back at
pre-Enron levels” within national firms surveyed); KROLL, supra note 67, at 6–7 (noting increases in
overall incidence of corporate fraud and weakening internal controls among firms surveyed globally).
230
ETHICS RESEARCH CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY: AN INSIDE VIEW OF PRIVATE
SECTOR ETHICS v (2007), available at http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/The_2007_National_Business_Et
hics_Survey.pdf.
231
See Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REV.
757, 766–72 (2005) (discussing the limitations of monetary fines as a tool to effect large-scale reform
of organizational culture).
232
See MARK CASSON, THE ECONOMICS OF BUSINESS CULTURE: GAME THEORY, TRANSACTION
COSTS, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 255 (1991) (noting that third party organizations such as the
state can reduce transaction costs by punishing cheaters, and thus allowing actors to trust each other);
see also Eisenberg, supra note 153, at 1274 (observing that moral whistleblowing reduces transactional
costs and enhances performance in ways incentive-based SEC rules and regulations alone cannot).
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foremost a moral enterprise.
Therefore, the SEC should treat
whistleblowing not just as the profitable thing to do, but also as the right
thing to do.
The place to start is with the distinction between internal and external
whistleblowing. This distinction can be most clearly seen by viewing the
whistleblowing enterprise through the lens of (1) the common good of
mutual self-interest and (2) the principle of subsidiarity. Internal
whistleblowing is mandated, according to the first guiding principle, by the
basic good of community within corporations and the norm of cooperation.
The second principle affirms the primacy of internal whistleblowing over
external whistleblowing. Together, these two principles support the claim
that whistleblowers have a moral duty to make a good faith effort to work
internally with the company to solve compliance problems before resorting
to external whistleblowing.
The remainder of this Part explores how these two guiding principles
can help reshape the SEC’s new whistleblower bounty program to ensure it
is properly oriented with the moral considerations underlying
whistleblowing.
A. The Principle of Mutual Self-Interest
One of the primary questions that the SEC should ask is what role does
the employer’s and the employee’s mutual self-interest play in corporate
compliance? By not requiring employees to make a good faith effort to
report potential violations internally before attempting to collect a bounty,
the SEC program unnecessarily risks destroying the basic good of
community within corporations. A proper normative framework would
recognize the importance of the employer and the employee’s shared
interest in cooperating to solve compliance issues. Although a full
framework is beyond the scope of this Article, a good start would be to
recognize what many perfectionist legal scholars call “the common good”
of mutual self-interest.233 Mutual self-interest is an aspect or instantiation
of the basic human good of community.234 This simple but profound idea

233
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 10, at 305. The term “common good” refers to “the good
of individuals, living together and depending upon on another in ways that favour [sic] the well-being
of each.” Id. It includes factors which “make sense of or give reason for [an employee’s] collaboration
with [an employer] and would likewise, from their point of view, give reason for [an employer’s]
collaboration . . . with him.” Id. at 154; see also ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL
LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 162–63 (1993) (describing the moral perfectionism of Joseph Raz,
which includes the idea that governments may advance individual autonomy by “protecting morally
valuable options for choice” through social policies).
234
In his various writings, Finnis identifies seven basic goods, the intrinsic value of which is selfevident to all rational human beings. These include: knowledge; life; work and play; friendship and
association (or sociability); aesthetic experience; practical reasonableness; and religion. It is from these
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is essential to implementing the SEC’s new bounty program without
undermining preexisting and future internal compliance and reporting
systems.
The SEC generally assumes that self-interest will stymie most, if not
all, legitimate compliance efforts. This adversarial (or contractarian)
approach to corporate regulation is what led the SEC to conclude that if
corporations are driven by profit to avoid costly regulatory compliance,
then conversely, a lucrative bounty program is needed to counter that urge
by financially incentivizing employees to report a corporation’s
noncompliance. Self-interest, however, does not alone lead to corporate
fraud and corruption.235 Although the employer and the employee are both
driven by self-interest, this shared self-interest does not make the corporate
enterprise immoral or evil.236 On the contrary, this arrangement not only
permits both parties to make money, but it also provides a forum in which
people can exercise their talents, find fulfillment, and realize their values.
It is only when they are acting pursuant to non-mutual interests (i.e.,
perverse ulterior motives) that self-interest is a real issue. Just like bribery,
kickbacks, and financial fraud, laws and regulations that undermine mutual
self-interest are bad for business.237 These corrupting influences are not
just illegal or damaging to a company’s reputation; they destroy the
cooperative relationships intrinsic in all corporations that are necessary for
the company to be profitable. They transform cooperative relationships
into “relationships of mistrust, antagonism and exploitation.”238 Therefore,
the most successful corporate compliance regulations will promote the
common good of mutual self-interest in minimizing the costs of
basic goods that natural law theorists argue all other human goods derive their value. FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW, supra note 10, at 85–90.
235
See JIM COLLINS, GOOD TO GREAT: WHY SOME COMPANIES MAKE THE LEAP . . . AND OTHERS
DON’T 41 (2001) (observing the importance to an organization’s success of having the right individuals
within that organization, which can be extended from for-profit purposes to ones of social
responsibility); Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Internal Whistleblowing:
Protecting the Interests of the Employee, the Organization and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 267, 299–301
(arguing that the actions of internal whistleblowers and their employers serve the interests of these
parties by avoiding adverse publicity and legal consequences, while also reforming their organization
from within).
236
Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 235, at 299–303 (arguing that self-interest is not inherently
wrong).
237
See Stefan Rützel, Snitching for the Common Good: In Search of a Response to the Legal
Problems Posed by Environmental Whistleblowing, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 44 (1995)
(arguing that while “monetary incentives may encourage whistleblowing, and while self-interest as a
motive for reporting is not inherently wrong, financial rewards are seemingly inappropriate” because
they “increase[] the danger of frivolous complaints,” their costs offset any potential savings, and they
may have been unnecessary).
238
Sean Kelsey & Thomas R. Krause, Leading with Ethics: The Cooperative Model and the
Example of Workplace Safety, in RETHINKING BUSINESS MANAGEMENT: EXAMINING THE
FOUNDATIONS OF BUSINESS EDUCATION 118, 119 (Samuel Gregg & James R. Stoner, Jr. eds., 2008).
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noncompliance for both the company and its employees.
Unfortunately, the SEC’s new bounty program actually undermines the
collaborative or cooperative relationship between the employer-company
and the employees by promoting employee non-mutual interest in a
bounty. The prospect of a multi-million dollar bounty may overcome
certain self-interests and transaction costs preventing corporate
whistleblowers from collaborating with the government, but only at
considerable cost to efforts promoting cooperation, coordination, and
mutual responsibility between these same whistleblowers and their
respective companies. In addition, legally excusing an employee’s failure
to report potential violations to his or her employer effectively severs the
employee’s preexisting financial interest in a paycheck from the success of
the company’s internal compliance and reporting systems and converts this
to a non-mutual self-interest.
The SEC insists mandatory internal pre-reporting would not make any
difference with respect to those whistleblowers who are already predisposed to report internally.239 In addition, the SEC claims the bounty
program will induce some individuals who, absent any financial incentive,
would never have reported either internally or externally to the SEC in the
first place.240 However, the SEC leaves the single, largest category of
employees completely out of their analysis: those who report internally
because it is in their mutual self-interest. The SEC bounty program does
much more than simply create a financial incentive to report potential
violations to the SEC; it essentially changes the terms and conditions of
employment. It effectively prohibits employers from requiring that
employees immediately report potential violations to the company as a
condition of employment. Employers are now legally forced to leave to
the whistleblower the decision whether to report allegations internally.
The SEC claims this as an additional “advantage” to its approach:
[I]t allows whistleblowers to select the proper reporting
procedures under the specific circumstances. Whistleblowers
can balance the potential increase in the probability and
magnitude of an award by participating in an effective
internal compliance mechanism, against the particular risks
that may result from doing so, which could include
retaliation, loss of anonymity (for those companies that may
not have effective anonymous reporting procedures), delay
due to an ineffective or questionable internal compliance
239
See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,360 (June
13, 2011) (specifying that whistleblowers who report internally would receive a whistleblower award
from the SEC with participation in an internal report framework counting as a “plus-factor”).
240
Id.
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mechanism, and destruction of evidence based on the nature
of the allegations or the corporate environment. On balance,
we believe that, from a law-enforcement perspective, overall
efficiency is better promoted by allowing whistleblowers to
make this assessment on a case-by-case basis.241
The SEC’s conclusion, however, assumes all financial incentives are
equal, when they are not. Some financial awards may promote cooperation
between the employer and employee, while other incentives can hinder
such cooperation. Yet, despite the obvious benefits of employer-employee
collaboration, the SEC was unwilling to take on the responsibility (and
inherent political risks) of assessing whether a whistleblower should be
required to cooperate with an employer’s internal reporting system.242 The
SEC excused this willful neglect by claiming fact-intensive assessments
would “divert limited resources from the [SEC’s] primary objective of
investigating allegations of wrongdoing.”243
Such an assessment, however, does not depend on fact-intensive
empirical research; instead, it rests on the proper understanding of the basic
good of community within corporations. The true nature of corporations as
communities is obscured by the fact that they are sometimes spoken of as a
legal fiction or “system” and at other times referred to as persons with
interests and rights.244 According to the legal philosopher John Finnis,
however, a corporation is best understood as a “community of joint action”
formed between, among others, an employer and its employees.245 Finnis
uses a variety of synonyms to describe this “joint action,” including
“collaboration, co-operation, and co-ordination.”246 He also includes in
that same grouping what he calls “negative co-ordination,” by which he
means “mutual non-interference,” such as abstaining from harming the
other.247
This coordination serves at least two of the most basic human goods.
This is true even if the only reason an employee collaborates or cooperates
with his or her employer is the business relationship. Beyond the value of
what he or she can get paid, for example, there is the value of “skillful

241

Id. at 34,361–62 & n.462.
Id. at 34,361 (noting that the inability of the SEC to promptly respond to the necessity of
individual whistleblowers to report internally would lead to the program being less cost-effective, and
possibly less successful, given that it might reduce overall whistleblowing).
243
Id. at 34,362.
244
See FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 10, at 135 (arguing that since all groups are a matter of
relationship and interaction, they should be defined as an ongoing state of affairs, or in the broadest
sense, as a form of unifying relationship between human beings).
245
Id. at 138.
246
Id.
247
Id.
242
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performance, in work and play,” which Finnis identifies as a basic good.248
An employee also values being a part of an “association between persons,”
which Finnis refers to as the basic good of sociability or “community.”249
The intrinsic value of these basic goods is self-evident and therefore,
according to natural law scholars, known to all.250 Other scholars, in fact,
who do not necessarily consider themselves a part of the recent
revitalization of the natural law tradition, agree that community is a basic
good.251 For example, the perfectionist liberal philosopher Joseph Raz
holds that “living in a society” is intrinsically good.252 Even contemporary
liberal theorists like Ronald Dworkin recognize the need to balance
individual rights with individual responsibilities to the community because
“[i]t is part of any proper conception of personal responsibility that people
should make . . . choices . . . with an eye to the opportunity costs to others
of the choices that they make.”253
In addition, these perfectionist philosophers are not alone in defending
the corporation as a community. Like Finnis, a group of organizational
management and corporate law scholars known as “corporate
communitarians” also views the employer-employee relationship as one of
collaboration.254 These corporate communitarians must be distinguished
from political philosophy communitarians like Alasdair MacIntyre, 255
248

John Finnis, Liberalism and Natural Law Theory, 45 MERCER L. REV. 687, 691–92 (1994).
Id. at 691. He also refers to the basic good of association between persons as “friendship.” Id.
250
Adam J. MacLeod, Identifying Values in Land Use Regulation, 101 KY. L.J. (forthcoming
2012) (explaining that intrinsic means “it is not contingent upon anything more basic than itself”).
251
See, e.g., RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 9, at 199 (observing that living within a tolerant and
educated society is beneficial to individuals); Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 90 B.U. L. REV.
469, 470 (2010) [hereinafter Dworkin, Justice] (arguing that through government people can
collectively ensure their individual right to self-determination).
252
RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 9, at 206.
253
Dworkin, Justice, supra note 251, at 470; see also id. (“[P]eople should make such choices
with a sense of the consequences.”).
254
See Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholders and Corporate
Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 395–96 (1993) (observing
that the corporate communitarianism “seeks to undermine the law’s distinction between ‘public’ and
‘private’ spheres of activity”); see also Jeffrey Bone, Legal Perspectives on Corporate Responsibility:
Contractarian or Communitarian Thought?, 24 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 277, 278 (2011) (noting that
“communitarians emphasize cooperation, justice, and civic responsibility”); Thomas C. Kohler,
Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, 1993 BYU L. REV. 727, 728 (1993) (arguing against
the individualism that leads us to “reject our character as social beings”); Millon, supra note 176, at
1378–79 (observing that communitarians emphasize the broad social effects of corporate activity on
non-shareholders over the narrow range of monetizable interests of those within the corporation).
255
See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 5 (2d ed. 1984) (arguing that “the integral
substance of morality has to a large degree been fragmented and then in part destroyed,” which has
resulted in a lack of rational ways for our society to deal with moral problems). Other leading political
philosophy communitarians, such as Richard Rorty, Charles Taylor, and Michael Sandel, share
MacIntyre’s anti-corporate views. See, e.g., MICHAEL SANDEL, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY: ESSAYS ON
MORALITY IN POLITICS 43 (2005) (arguing against large corporations because they are unaccountable
to the communities they serve).
249
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because the latter group reaches very different normative conclusions
regarding corporations.256 Nevertheless, several legal and business
scholars have used MacIntyre’s concepts of “practices” and “communities
of purpose” for the basis of a framework of business ethics.257 In
particular, corporate communitarians agree with perfectionist philosophers
that the concept of the corporation as a community is essential to
mitigating the errors of both individualism and collectivism inherent in
many corporation laws and regulations.258 They see the corporation as
more than simply a contractual arrangement between individuals.259 They
seek to inject a sense of mutual responsibility into the discussion that
seems too often defined by individual rights.260
The primary difference between communitarians and perfectionists is
their respective starting points for deliberations about the common good.
As we have already noted, new natural law theorists, like Finnis, begin
with a set of basic goods, which are deemed self-evident, from which they

256
Alasdair MacIntyre, Corporate Modernity and Moral Judgment: Are They Mutually
Exclusive?, in ETHICS AND PROBLEMS OF THE 21ST CENTURY 122, 124 (K.E. Goodpaster & K.M. Sayre
eds., 1979) (rejecting the idea of the corporation as a community, and asserting that the “modern
corporation is an agency which by its moralizing splinters morality into dissociated parts”); see also
Ron Beadle, The Misappropriation of MacIntyre, 2 REASON IN PRACTICE 45, 52–53 (2002) (reversing
his position in an earlier work and concluding businesses are “neither practices nor communities of
purpose”).
257
See Kathryn Balstad Brewer, Management as a Practice: A Response to Alasdair MacIntyre,
16 J. BUS. ETHICS 825, 829 (1997) (arguing that “management can be construed as a practice under
MacIntyre’s definition” where “the manager operates within a socially established field”); Geoff
Moore, On the Implications of the Practice Institution Distinction: MacIntyre and the Application of
Modern Virtue Ethics to Business, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 19, 22–23 (2002) (arguing that a business is a
practice); Richard Warren, The Empty Company: Morality and Job Security, 25 PERSONNEL REV., Apr.
1996 (arguing corporations are a kind of incubator in which individuals can learn the worth of virtue);
Ron Beadle, Virtue Ethics and Employment or the Case of the Cancelled Holiday 9–11 (Jan. 7, 1998)
(unpublished paper, Kingston Bus. Sch.), available at http://northumbria.academia.edu/RonBeadle/Pap
ers/291898/Virtue_Ethics_and_ Employment_or_The_Case_of_the_Cancelled_Holiday (arguing that
“employment is itself a practice”).
258
See Daniel J. Ott, Process Communitarianism, 10 CONSCRESCENCE: AUSTRALASIAN J.
PROCESS THOUGHT 67, 67 (2009), available at concrescence.org/index.php/ajpt/article/download/75/39
(discussing “[t]he core conviction of [communitarianism]” which advocates the “the renewal and/or
creation of human community” to “mitigate the errors of both individualism and collectivism” and “to
correct ideologies that have led to destructive practices” (alteration in original)).
259
Communitarianism is generally associated with themes of single constituency, Catholic social
thought, and corporate citizenship.
260
In the corporate context, communitarianism generally promotes the idea of corporate social
responsibility. It also tends to support unions and other self-organized mediating structures in the
workplace. See Kohler, supra note 254, at 740 (arguing mediating structures like unions help counter
“formal individualism” in which individuals have become increasingly dependent on their employers
and the state to regulate the order of the employment relationship); Alia McMullen, New Streams of
Responsibility; A Company’s Social Work Should be Aligned with Its Business, FIN. POST, Mar. 23,
2010, at FP8 (discussing some approaches of corporate social responsibility, such as cutting water use
and promoting sustainable practices in the office).
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can deduce and apply other common goods.
Communitarians, on the
other hand, begin by asking, “What is the common good?” They maintain
that “society should articulate what is good,” and they see their job as
interpreting
and
refining
those
immanent
values.262 Thus,
communitarianism is best understood as the process by which the
community deliberates about the common good rather than as a defined set
of moral principles to be applied.263
Under either theoretical construct, however, the whistleblower’s moral
responsibility to cooperate in his or her corporate community is more than
just a contractual obligation between an employee and an employer. We
each have the responsibility, as Finnis puts it, to “do as one would be done
by.”264 Corporate whistleblowers incur this responsibility by virtue of the
employment relationship. This relationship creates a “special frame of
reference or vantage point” that gives each party a “special locus standi,”
or “right to claim performance.”265 Even if a whistleblower is not working
under a written employment contract, certain promises or responsibilities
are derived from the employment relationship itself as an instrument of
cooperation. According to Finnis, the content of those responsibilities
depends on: (1) the employee’s “own voluntary commitment[]” to being
employed; (2) the employee’s “present receipt of benefits” from the
employer; and (3) the dependence of others in the workplace on the
employee as a result of “actual or potential interdependencies” existing
between employees of a corporation.266 The responsibility to adhere to this
tacit promise should be respected for the whistleblower’s own good, which
is in turn overlapped by the common good.267
All corporations and employees, including corporate whistleblowers,
are motivated by the common good of mutual self-interest.268

261

See supra note 247.
Amitai Etzioni, A Communitarian Approach: A Viewpoint on the Study of the Legal, Ethical
and Policy Considerations Raised by DNA Tests and Databases, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 214, 214
(2006) (“Hence communitarians are interested in communities (and moral dialogues within them),
historically transmitted values and mores, and the societal units that transmit and enforce group
values . . . which are all parts of communities.”).
263
See Michele Estrin Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward a Community-Based
Welfare System, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 733–34 (2005) (explaining communitarians view the
community as the primary value in society and contend it is a mistake to strive for universal principles
of justice).
264
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 10, at 304.
265
Id.
266
Id. at 175.
267
See id. at 305 (discussing how “[t]he good of an individual party to . . . the promise . . . is part
of the common good” because “[t]he common good is the good of individuals, living together and
depending upon one another in ways that favour the well-being of each”).
268
See id. (“[I]t is a truth of wide application that an individual acts most appropriately for the
common good, not by trying to estimate the needs of the common good at large, but by performing his
262
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Fundamentally, a company engages in any business activity, including
legal compliance efforts, because it wants to make a profit and its
employees participate in or support that activity because they want to earn
a living.269 Over the last decade, researchers in the field of organizational
behavior management have studied numerous samples of whistleblowers,
using sound descriptive and empirical research methods. Their findings
provide an emerging picture of whistleblowers that is remarkably
consistent with this fundamental idea. For example, research has shown
that most whistleblowers are not disgruntled employees; on the contrary,
they identify with the company and are committed to its goals.270 Other
research confirms that people are motivated to do what they believe
benefits others, not just themselves.271
This notion of a common interest or common pursuit between a
company and its employees is critical to corporate compliance efforts
generally.272 With a shared objective, both the employer and the employee
will often look for best practices for solving their coordination problems
and will recognize the authority of the person designated to select among
available solutions.273 Although the particulars of a corporate compliance
program can vary depending on the business of the organization, an
integral part of any effective program is a consistent internal process for
internally reporting potential violations. The corporate system operates
most efficiently where corporate employees act cooperatively—and are
perceived as doing so. For example, most companies require as a
condition of employment that their employees commit to helping monitor
and report potential securities violations internally.274 In one recent survey,
90% of respondents, including 99% of respondents from publicly traded

contractual undertakings, and fulfilling his other responsibilities, to ascertained individuals . . . to those
who have particular rights correlative to his duties.”).
269
See id. (discussing how “[f]ulfilling one’s particular obligations . . . is necessary if one is to
respect and favour [sic] the common good”).
270
Brewer & Selden, supra note 25, at 419; see also id. at 420 (concluding that “[o]ur review of
the literature did not uncover a single study published during the last decade that refutes the
findings . . . outlined above”).
271
STOUT, supra note 12, at 114–18.
272
See, e.g., Comment from Watts, supra note 165, at 1 (“AT&T maintains mandatory ethical and
Code of Conduct training programs for all employees, offers anonymous hotlines for the reporting of
complaints or violations, and repeatedly emphasizes to its employees the need to foster an ethical and
compliant business environment at all times.”).
273
In most companies the internal audit or legal department is responsible for the internal
compliance and reporting systems.
274
See, e.g., Comment from Watts, supra note 165, at 2 (“AT&T believes that it is critical to any
compliance program that an employee who is aware of potential misconduct, but who stands by
silently, be barred from any aware or bounty . . . . [E]ach [employee] is also responsible for voice any
compliance or ethical concerns. Every company must rely on its employees not only to develop and
implement new ideas but to do so ethically and in compliance with the company’s code of conduct.”).
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companies, reported having employee hotlines in place.
Those activities
must be coordinated, either for the sake of the coordinated interaction itself
or for some other shared objective. A legal regime that promotes the views
that the moral norm of cooperation is only instrumental, and thereby
diminishes both the force of the norm and its internalization, would reduce
the efficiency of the corporate compliance system.276
Leading treatises on business ethics have also concluded that using
internal before external channels is the only moral choice for a
whistleblower, unless he or she reasonably expects that using the internal
channel will result in retaliation against him or her.277 For example,
Professor Bowie’s treatise, Business Ethics, warns the whistleblower to use
internal channels first, if possible, and to act in accordance with his or her
responsibilities for “avoiding and/or exposing moral violations.”278 It also
includes the now famous dictum that the act of whistleblowing must stem
from appropriate moral motives of preventing unnecessary harm to
others.279 Yet, the SEC’s new bounty program actually incentivizes moral
harm to employees by prompting them to act for merely instrumental
reasons, at the unnecessary expense of mutual self-interest and
cooperation.
Since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, several commentators have
suggested that one way for corporations to still achieve cooperation,
without the SEC mandating internal reporting, is by the corporation
creating counterincentives.280 However, the more effective it would be in
275
Impact of Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions: What Companies Are Doing!, SOC’Y CORP.
COMPLIANCE & ETHICS (Sept. 15, 2011, 11:42 AM), http://www.corporatecompliance.org/Resources/
View/smid/940/ArticleID/329.aspx.
276
See Eisenberg, supra note 153, at 1266, 1291 (arguing that “the social norm of loyalty that the
legal rules support and define is critical to the efficient operation of the duty of loyalty” thus “[i]n the
loyalty area, social norms increase efficiency”).
277
See NORMAN E. BOWIE, BUSINESS ETHICS 144 (1982) (“Since the whistle blower does have an
obligation of loyalty to his or her employer, he or she should—at least in normal circumstances—use
the institutional mechanisms that have been created for the purpose of registering dissent with the
polices or actions of the corporation.”); R.T. DE GEORGE, BUSINESS ETHICS 232–33 (2d. ed. 1986)
(arguing that whistle blowing is only morally justifiable if the employee “exhaust[s] the internal
procedures and possibilities within the firm” because “whistle blowing does harm to the firm, [and]
harm in general is minimized if the firm is informed of the problem and allowed to correct it”).
278
BOWIE, supra note 277, at 143; see Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Whistle-Blowing: Myth
and Reality, 22 J. MGMT. 507, 509 (1996) (“[O]rganizations being accused of wrongdoing would prefer
that whistle-blowers use internal channels to report the wrongdoing rather than external . . . . Bowie . . .
and other ethicists . . . have implied that this is the only moral action, unless the whistle-blower expects
that this channel will result in retaliation against him or her.”).
279
See BOWIE, supra note 277, at 143 (“The moral aim of whistle blowing is deemed so central
that it is made part of the definition, namely, whistle blowing aims at exposing unnecessary harm,
violation of human rights, or conduct counter to the defined purpose of the corporation.”).
280
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,326 (June 13,
2011); see also supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing how some corporations have already
created countermeasures to increase the effectiveness of internal reporting of fraud).
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countering a multi-million dollar bounty reward, the more expensive it
would need to be. In contrast, using the law itself to facilitate a corporate
culture of cooperation by mandating internal reporting is relatively
inexpensive.
Despite all of the foregoing reasons to conclude otherwise, the SEC’s
final rules reflect a much narrower conception of an employee’s reciprocal
responsibilities to a corporation. The SEC rules address some but not all
aspects of the mutual responsibility between a whistleblower and his or her
employer. As discussed earlier, the SEC rules attempt to address causal
responsibility.281 The rules also address what could be called supervisory
or assignment responsibility.282 However, the current SEC rules do not
address mutual responsibility. As a consequence, the SEC’s new bounty
program fails to recognize the importance of an employer and employee’s
shared intention to cooperate via internal compliance and reporting
systems.283
If the only reason for not bypassing internal reporting is the prospect of
a slight reduction in the bounty, then whistleblowers can be expected to
regularly violate that duty. If the violation is undetected, the whistleblower
comes out ahead. If it is detected, the whistleblower is still statistically
better off with the slight deduction than he or she would have been if he or
she had cooperated internally. While it is possible that the SEC might
reduce the bounty to zero, these sanctions are not typical, and thus the
prospect of such sanctions, discounted by the likelihood that they will be
imposed, will be unlikely to change the picture that much.
This not only undermines the usefulness of internal reporting systems,
but it also undermines the common good of “individuals, living together
and depending upon one another in ways that favour [sic] the well being of
each . . . derived from basic requirements of practicable reasonableness.”284
The corporate whistleblower who knows about a potential securities
violation has a moral obligation to immediately report it to the company.
This responsibility stems “from the sheer fact of ability to co-ordinate
action for the common good.”285 This ability (or what Finnis elsewhere
calls authority) “accrues . . . for the sake of the standing needs of the good
of persons in community—from the sheer fact of power, of opportunity to
affect, for good, the common life,”286 and the internal reporting system
281

See supra Part III.B. (discussing the eligibility exclusions for a whistleblower award).
See id. (discussing the eligibility exclusions, as promulgated in the final rules).
283
Internal compliance programs presuppose that employers and employees have a shared interest
to cooperate with each other. Thus, self-interest is not necessarily immoral. I argue it is only nonmutual self-interest that is wrong.
284
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 10, at 305. Practicable reasonableness is the basic good
that structures our pursuit of all the other basic human goods. Id. at 100.
285
Id. at 252.
286
Id. at 275 (emphasis added).
282
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represents just such a missed opportunity to affect. In other words, by
failing to respect the authority of his employer, a whistleblower who fails
to report internally privileges his private gain over the common life of the
corporation’s members, and all who depend on them.
The SEC’s final rules leave it up to the employee to decide whether to
take seriously this responsibility to report internally first. Whether that
duty exists, however, cannot turn on the internal attitude of the employee.
Individual motivations will vary. In addition, employees are not in the best
position to decide whether to utilize an internal reporting system because
they will be preoccupied with trying to convince the SEC to bring the
enforcement action to worry about “the general needs of the common good
which justify authority.”287
The bounty program treats the corporate whistleblower like he or she
was just some random third party who chooses to blow the whistle on a
particular company. The difference between a corporate whistleblower
and other whistleblowers, however, is that a corporate whistleblower is an
employee of the company, and his or her purpose for being there is to work
for the company: to increase its profits, or to earn his or her wages, or both.
Therefore, the corporate whistleblower must be willing to change his or her
conduct to meet the shared business goals of his or her employer. In
contrast, an independent whistleblower’s purposes may or may not be
coordinated with the company’s, but they are not shared. At best, they are
what Finnis calls “tangential or coincidental aims.”288 If a corporate
whistleblower conspires with a third party to harm the corporation, then he
or she has undermined the employer-employee relationship, even if only
temporarily. Likewise, a corporate whistleblower can work as an
informant with the SEC without undermining his or her relationship with
their company only if the corporate whistleblower exhausts internal report
channels first, where possible.289
Ultimately, a corporate whistleblower who bypasses a company’s
internal compliance system is acting irresponsibly with regard to his or her
corporate community despite the fact that the SEC’s final rules declare it to
be legal.290 A whistleblower-employee who uses legally recognized
authority to “promote [selfish] schemes thoroughly opposed to practical
reasonableness cannot then reasonably claim to have discharged his own
287

Id. at 249.
Id. at 152.
289
Under the principle of double effect, any harm that the employee’s action causes to the
corporate community is not morally culpable as long as the harm was an unintended, secondary
consequence of the employee’s action.
290
See FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 10, at 246 (“The fact that the say-so of a particular
person or body or configuration of persons will in fact be, by and large, complied with and acted upon,
has normative consequences of practical reasonableness; it affects the responsibilities of both ruler and
ruled by creating certain exclusionary reasons for action.”).
288

536

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:483

responsibilities in reason.”
Bypassing an internal complaint process to
maximize the potential for a large bounty denies the corporate community
the opportunity to correct wrongful conduct in its midst, and is thus
inconsistent with the common good of mutual self-interest.292
291

B. The Communitarian Principle of Subsidiarity
A second, equally important structural principle for making
whistleblowing moral is the notion of subsidiarity. This principle creates a
presumption in favor of solving compliance problems at the corporate
level, or even sub-corporate level, rather than immediately escalating the
problem to the higher level of a federal government agency. Even
assuming the basic good of community, and the importance of cooperation,
a corporate whistleblower must still sometimes choose between
cooperating with the company and cooperating with the SEC. As
demonstrated below, the principle of subsidiarity can help whistleblowers
mediate between these two conflicting roles in a way that maintains the
morality of whistleblowing.
The bounty program, as currently implemented, attempts to reduce the
issue of sequencing to a strictly rational economic analysis. By not
mandating any particular sequence, the SEC leaves the decision entirely up
to the individual whistleblower; the SEC’s only apparent expectation is
that the whistleblower will choose the path that best maximizes the amount
of any monetary reward.
However, the sequence itself has far-reaching moral implications.
Historically, the conflict between a whistleblower’s citizenship duties and
his or her corporate citizenship duties has proven to be a significant source
of moral tension.293 According to the SEC, the issue received more focus
during the notice of proposed rulemaking for the new bounty program
process than the role of internal compliance programs.294 Many of those
comments implicitly raise not only prudential, but also normative concerns
about permitting whistleblowers to bypass internal reporting channels in
direct contravention to the principal of subsidiarity.295
The subsidiarity principle states that “each social and political group
should help smaller or more local [forms of human association] accomplish
their respective ends without, however, arrogating those tasks to itself.” 296
In the corporate compliance context, it means looking first to employees to
291

Id.
Id.
293
Lobel, supra note 18, at 438.
294
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300 (June 13, 2011).
295
Id. at 34,361.
296
Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law,
97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 38 n.1 (2003).
292
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police themselves, then to companies, and only then to state and federal
agencies.297 The idea is that a society is “more just and more functional if
the work that can be done by the parts is done by the parts, rather than
being taken over by the whole.”298
Like the principle of mutual self-interest, subsidiarity is rooted in a
natural law understanding of the common good as a totality of the
conditions necessary for a full and flourishing human life.299 Proponents of
subsidiarity maintain that the ultimate purpose of the government, the
corporation and all other mega structures is to serve human flourishing. 300
They further maintain this goal is best achieved by the organization that is
closest to the individual because of the reflexive strategy inherent in the
modern regulatory approach to corporate compliance known as “enforced
self-regulation.”301 The goal of enforced self-regulation should be to
structure corporations to make them “sensitive to the outside effects of
their attempts to maximize internal rationality.”302 Consequently, they tend
to favor smaller and more local forms of human associations, like the
family, churches, and corporations, which presumably can act more
efficaciously in individual lives than the federal government.303
Historically, the idea of subsidiarity can be traced back to classical
Greece and was later embraced by Aquinas.304 It can also be found in the
writings of Montesquieu, Locke, Tocqueville305 and others who helped
shaped the Founding Fathers’ understanding of federalism here in the
United States.306
The Republican G.O.P. has often portrayed its
297
Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND. L.
REV. 103, 104 (2001). In the social context that means always look first to families to help their own,
then to churches, neighborhood associations, civic groups, and other community organizations. Id.
298
Fred Crosson, Catholic Social Teaching and American Society, in PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC
SOCIAL TEACHING 165, 170–71 (David A. Boileau ed., 1998).
299
Carozza, supra note 296, at 43.
300
Id.
301
IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 106 (1992) (proposing institutional changes in regulatory structures based on
reflexivity); see also Carozza, supra note 296, at 43 (explaining the liner and organic structure of
various human associations and that larger groups are understood to serve the individual).
302
Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
239, 278 (1983).
303
Several scholars have noted that some corporations, depending on their size and hierarchy, can
be just as problematic as governments. See Vischer, supra note 297, at 129 (stating “the corporation is
a money-generating enterprise, not a means for furthering subsidiarity’s objectives”).
304
Carozza, supra note 296, at 40–41.
305
See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., 1988) (“[A]t the head of any new undertaking, where in France you would find the
government or in England some territorial magnate, in the United States you are sure to find an
association.”).
306
David P. Currie, Subsidiarity, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 359, 363 (1998). But see George A. Bermann,
Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 404 (1994) (“[A]lthough federalism conveys a
general sense of a vertical distribution, or balance, of power, it is not generally understood as
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compassionate conservatism as synonymous with subsidiarity.
More
recently, the term subsidiarity reemerged as one of the central
constitutional principles (organizing principles) of the European Union.308
As a political theory, critics have claimed “that subsidiarity is ‘weak,
subjective, and open-ended.’”309 The fact that advocates at both ends of
the political spectrum have employed the principle seemingly supports that
claim. However, subsidiarity is not simply an abstract principle of
governance, rather it is a practical framework for solving real problems. In
the workplace, subsidiarity has proven particularly useful in imposing both
limitations and affirmative duties on employers and employees. For
example, Pope Leo XIII, and later Pope Pius XI, used the principle to help
forge a middle ground between the extremes of laissez-faire capitalism and
Marxist socialism in order to advocate better working conditions and
collective bargaining rights for workers in the nineteenth century.310
In the context of corporate whistleblowing, subsidiarity is best
understood as occupying a middle ground between the traditional
command-and-control model, on the one hand, and the pure self-regulation
model on the other. Under the traditional command-and-control model,
reliance on corporate codes of conduct, internal reporting systems and
other forms of self-regulation is a weakness to be overcome by
substantially increasing the size and capacity of the SEC. Under a pure
self-regulation model, however, recent efforts to bolster public
enforcement efforts are further proof that a top-down regulatory approach
will not and cannot reduce the level of corporate fraud and corruption.
Subsidiarity, on the other hand, makes complete sense of both aspects of
enforced self-regulation. Subsidiarity accounts for the discretion afforded
to prosecutors and corporations as well as the relationship between internal
and external whistleblowing. It does so by recognizing the capacity and
responsibility of corporations with respect to compliance issues, and
treating regulatory enforcement as properly supplemental or “subsidiary.”
expressing a preference for any particular distribution of that power. . . . [F]ederalism and subsidiarity,
though of course closely related, are quite different.”).
307
See Rick Santorum, A Compassionate Conservative Agenda: Addressing Poverty for the Next
Millennium, 26 J. LEGIS. 93, 94 (2000) (explaining that the “‘compassionate conservative’ approach
recognizes that government must work as a ‘silent partner,’ enabling communities, organizations and
individuals to be innovative in rescuing those for whom American prosperity is so elusive”); see also
MICHAEL NOVAK, ON CULTIVATING LIBERTY 97 (Brian C. Anderson ed., 1999) (concluding that the
modern administrative state exists because “the principle of subsidiarity is continually violated”).
308
See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 (formally
recognizing in the preamble subsidiarity as one of the principles governing fundamental rights);
Vischer, supra note 297, at 121. Although it appeared in debates on EC reform as early as 1975, the
use of subsidiarity “culminated with the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, in which ‘the subsidiarity principle
was proclaimed a guideline for further European integration.’” Id.
309
Vischer, supra note 297, at 121.
310
Carozza, supra note 296, at 41–42.
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Subsidiarity creates somewhat of a paradox as applied to
whistleblowers. It is able to simultaneously explain the need for internal
reporting systems and the dangers of mandatory internal reporting.
Subsidiarity suggests both a positive and a negative vision of the role of
the whistleblower with respect to government and the corporation.311 As
demonstrated below, this duality mandates that whistleblowers avail
themselves of effective internal reporting procedures.
Where the
corporation fails to establish or follow an internal compliance program,
however, the whistleblower is equally justified by subsidiarity in
cooperating directly with the regulatory authorities.
These two
complimentary dimensions are generally referred to as “negative
subsidiarity” and “positive subsidiarity.”
1. Negative Subsidiarity
Negative subsidiarity generally emphasizes the limits of government
intervention in business.312 As such, it expresses “a principle of noninterference of the state in the rights of the individual or . . . in the smaller
communities, namely where the individual or the small community is
capable to fulfill its tasks itself.”313 This limitation is derived, in turn, from
the proposition that the government, as one of the largest groupings in a
democratic society, does not exist for its own sake. Instead, government
exists to provide individuals and smaller communities like corporations
with the conditions enabling them to realize their own dignity or worth by
freely choosing good ends, and instantiating them by just and proper
means. To this end, negative subsidiarity denies the false dichotomy
between individualism and collectivism. It requires respect for both
individual rights and corporate rights because both are understood to be
incorporated into a broader common good. Respect for corporate rights
does not become counterproductive or unnecessary, but it is placed in an
integral relationship with individual rights to establish an internal
compliance culture for the benefit of the whistleblower.
To achieve this integration of corporate and individual rights, negative
subsidiarity first recognizes the inherent dignity and value of every
whistleblower.314 As an individual human being, the whistleblower “is
ontologically and morally prior” to the SEC or any other agency of the
government.315 Therefore, the SEC ought to be understood as serving the
311
Ken Endo, The Principle of Subsidiarity: From Johannes Althsuius to Jacques Delors, 44
HOKKAIDO L. REV. 2064, 2054 (1994).
312
See J. Verstraeten, Solidarity and Subsidiarity, in PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL
TEACHING, supra note 298, at 135.
313
Id.
314
Endo, supra note 311, at 2029.
315
Carozza, supra note 296, at 42.
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whistleblower, not vise versa. Under this approach, the value of the
individual whistleblower is not derived from a purely utilitarian concern
for regulatory efficiency. A whistleblower is more than just a potential
informant; a whistleblower is an employee who seeks to better him or her
self through work and other forms of cooperative activity. Work, as part of
the basic human good of “excellence in play and work,” enables an
individual to flourish as a human being.316 If a whistleblower’s human
dignity is served through work and not just by the act of whistleblowing
itself, then external whistleblowing must be done in such a way that
satisfies the conditions necessary to accomplish human dignity and not just
the successful prosecution of a corrupt corporation.
Of course, the SEC would likely argue that they uphold the human
dignity of whistleblowers by respecting individual autonomy and
encouraging but not requiring internal reporting. In reality, however, the
bounty program abandons individuals to themselves (or to the arbitrary
power of selfish greed and opportunism). Under the bounty program,
whistleblowers are not empowered to do the right thing; it makes no moral
demands on whistleblowers at all. Instead, it judges their worth solely by
the quality of their tips that, in turn, are judged by whether or not the
information they provide leads to an increase in the number of successful
prosecutions. Ultimately, there is nothing about this mere instrumentality
approach that suggests it is reasonably calculated to serve human
flourishing. Instead it seems more likely to reduce whistleblowers to being
mere agents of the SEC.
At the same time, respect for the dignity and value of whistleblowers
cannot be separated from respect for the corporate community, which
includes first and foremost respect for the employer-employee relationship.
In the case of the bounty program, this means respecting the autonomy and
self-sufficiency of the corporation in carrying out its own internal
compliance programs. This is not simply because a good corporate
compliance program depends for its success on the corporation and its
employees working together.
Rather, it is because subsidiarity
presupposes a substantive purpose and function for all corporations, “a
common good” that is not inconsistent with making a profit and “that is
ultimately directed toward the dignity of socially oriented human
beings.”317 Although many have attempted to do so, it is no answer to
argue that the modern corporation no longer has the common good as its
purpose or end. The dignity and value of whistleblowers, like any
individual, “requires relationship with others” in a community and

316
317

MARK C. MURPHY, NATURAL LAW AND PRACTICAL RATIONALITY 96 (2001).
Carozza, supra note 296, at 68.
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corporations are inevitably members of those communities.
As such,
corporations contribute to the conditions necessary for individual dignity
and human flourishing whether that is their stated purpose or not.319
Moreover, it is through their involvement in the internal compliance
process that whistleblowers can take part in applying law and morality to
their daily lives. Internal reporting systems contribute to that end in ways
which the SEC’s bounty program is ill suited; namely, internal reporting
simultaneously facilitates an individual’s pursuit of work and
association.320 Employees realize their value as human beings in part by
cooperating with their employers as members of that corporate community,
rather than just cooperating with a government agency.321
If corporations have value in providing individual employees with the
conditions to flourish, then negative subsidiarity obligates whistleblowers
to act at the lower level of the corporation first, and to work with the SEC
to do only what the corporation is unable or unwilling to do with the
whistleblower on its own. Since each level of society is responsible for
helping the “lower” one freely to accomplish its aims, it would undermine
the principle of subsidiarity for a whistleblower to opt to work with the
“higher” public authorities if he or she could have effectively worked with
some internal corporate group that is closer to the individual. According to
Professor Moberly, this harmonizes well with an employee’s sense of
loyalty to his or her employer.322
Therefore, the SEC should amend the rules to mandate internal
whistleblowing as a condition of being eligible for a bounty. Clearly, any
whistleblower program that seeks to divert every complaint or report to the
318
Id. at 42–43. Some scholars are reluctant to recognize corporations, especially large
corporations, as mediating structures. See, e.g., Timothy L. Fort & James J. Noone, Banded Contracts,
Mediating Institutions, and Corporate Governance: A Naturalist Analysis of Contractual Theories of
the Firm, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 163, 197 (1999) (expressing a belief that corporations currently
lack and need to embrace mediating institutions). This is a subject I want to more fully explore in a
future article about corporate personhood.
319
That said, this social dimension to corporations does arguably obligate shareholders, directors
and even employees to consider the common good in the use of corporate resources; however, this
obligation is beyond the scope of this Article. See Oliver F. Williams, Catholic Social Teaching: A
Communitarian Democratic Capitalism for the New World Order, in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND
THE NEW WORLD ORDER 5, 11 (Oliver F. Williams & John W. Houck eds., 1993) (stating this social
dimension requires consideration of the common good in which Williams describes throughout the
article as including respect for person and the social well-being of the group itself, which requires food,
clothes, health, work, education, culture, knowledge, family, etc., as well as peace and order).
320
Cynthia Estlund argues that the workplace is a crucial site for the boring of personal ties across
lines that often divide people through mediating between individual citizens and the broader diverse
citizenry. See Estlund, supra note 178, at 324 (arguing that changes in employment law and greater
self-enforcement is an opportunity to revive employees’ voices inside firms and reassert selfmonitoring).
321
This is why negative subsidiarity generally favors the free market over centralized
government.
322
Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model, supra note 71, at 1142–43.
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“higher” level of the government is incompatible with the basic
presumptions of subsidiarity. Such regulatory overreaching seriously
undermines the corporation as a lower form of voluntary association. To
put it in classical subsidiarity terms, mandatory internal whistleblowing
(with certain narrow exceptions) is the minimum that is necessary to
ensure that whistleblowers operate within the boundaries of subsidiarity
and that the SEC does not absorb the whistleblowers or “destroy”
whistleblowing as a moral institution.323
The SEC’s new bounty program borrowed heavily from the
whistleblower provisions of the False Claims Act (“FCA”),324 and the SEC
points to empirical studies of the FCA as evidence that whistleblowers will
not be diverted from reporting internally by their new bounty program. 325
One empirical study found that “the overwhelming majority of employees
voluntarily utilized internal reporting processes, despite the fact that they
were potentially eligible for a large reward under the FCA.”326 The FCA,
however, actually supports the counter argument because, until recently,
several courts read the FCA to require “employer notice” of a qui tam suit
in order to be eligible for an award.327 Prior to the 2009 amendments to the
FCA, the statute did not clearly include within the term “protected activity”
any activity conducted prior to filing the qui tam suit; therefore, some
courts relied on the common law understanding of the fiduciary nature of
the employer-employee relationship to infer a duty under the FCA to tell
the whistleblower’s employer that he or she planned to file a qui tam
action.328 Although Congress amended the FCA in 2009 to broaden the
323
Carozza, supra note 296, at 44. Equally irreconcilable, however, is a system that would
mandate internal reporting at the “lower” corporate level even in the absence of any effective internal
compliance program or where the complaint would be otherwise futile. This would inevitably do
violence to the dignity of the individual whistleblower. This point is made clear in the discussion of
positive subsidiarity.
324
See Baruch & Barr, supra note 104, at 28–29.
325
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,359 n.452 (June
13, 2011).
326
See Comment from Steven Kohn, Nat’l Whistleblowers Ctr. 4 (Dec. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-212.pdf. This study claims that “89.7% of employees
who would eventually file a qui tam case initially reported their concerns internally, either to
supervisors or compliance departments.” Id. Another study of qui tam cases involving pharmaceutical
companies showed “[n]early all (18 of 22) insiders first tried to fix matters internally by talking to their
superiors, filing an internal complaint, or both” despite the fact that the ultimate monetary awards from
external reporting were large, ranging from $100,000 to $42 million, with a median of $3 million.
Kesselheim et al., supra note 149, at 1834.
327
See Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 952 (5th Cir. 1994), cert denied,
513 U.S. 1154 (1995); United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935,
944 (6th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 1077 (1998) (treating the notice element as giving the
employer “reason to believe that the employee was contemplating a qui tam action” (quoting Mikes v.
Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d sub nom. United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus,
274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001)).
328
See Robertson, 32 F.3d at 951–52.
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329

language in question, and thereby eliminate any remaining statutory
ambiguity, this does not disprove the logic of the courts’ common sense
reasoning for filling in the gaps prior to the amendment with an internal
reporting requirement.
Currently, there is legislation pending before the 112th Congress that
would impose a similar requirement on the SEC’s new bounty program.
On July 11, 2011, Congressman Michael Grimm (R-NY) introduced the
Whistleblower Improvement Act of 2011, which would, among other
things, require internal reporting as a condition for money benefits.330 The
bill exempts a whistleblower from this requirement if internal reporting is
not a “viable option” as evidenced by either (1) upper management
committing or being involved in the alleged misconduct, or (2) “other
evidence of bad faith on the part of the employer.”331 In December 2011,
the bill passed through the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets and
Government Sponsored Enterprises and could be considered at any time by
the full House Financial Services Committee.332 While it faces stiff
opposition by whistleblower advocacy groups, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce is partnering with corporations like AT&T and UPS to lend
their full support for the bill. 333
2. Positive Subsidiarity
The second component of subsidiarity answers the question, “What are
the ‘narrow exceptions,’ if any, to the rule against external
whistleblowing?” Positive subsidiarity “involves the state intervening . . .
to secure the goods of the partial community, but only so long as the partial
community is incapable of achieving its ends.”334 It also includes “the help
which the individual or the small community may expect from the larger
community, but only when it is no longer capable of fulfilling its tasks
itself.”335 In other words, subsidiarity does not automatically lead to the
329
Peter B. Hutt et al., 2009 Amendments to False Claims Act Pose New Challenges to Health
Care Industry, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP (June 2, 2009),
http://www.akingump.com/communicationcenter/newsalertdetail.aspx?pub=2163.
330
The Whistleblower Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 2483, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011).
331
Id. § 2. The bill is modeled after the United Kingdom’s whistleblower law, which requires
internal reporting to obtain anti-retaliation protection. Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Whistleblowing:
Australian, U.K., and U.S. Approaches to Disclosure in the Public Interest, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 879, 890
(2004).
332
Dana Liebelson, New Bill to Weaken Protections, Incentives for Whistleblowers Sneak
Through
Committee,
TRUTHOUT
(Feb.
16,
2012
8:04
AM),
http://truthout.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=6721:new-bill-to-weaken-protections-incentivesfor-whistleblowers-sneaks-through-committee.
333
Andrew Joseph, Whistleblower Bill Draws Lobbying, GOV’T EXEC. (Jan. 10, 2012),
http://www.govexec.com/oversight/2012/01/whistleblower-bill-draws-lobbying/35798/.
334
Crosson, supra note 298, at 170–71.
335
Verstraeten, supra note 312, at 135.
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devolution of functions from the federal government to the corporation, as
some have suggested.336 On the contrary, the positive dimension of
subsidiarity implies that the government has both the responsibility and
authority to promote human flourishing and the common good; therefore, it
has the right and duty to intervene in the economic sphere to foster justice.
For the whistleblower, this means there are legitimate situations in
which a whistleblower may cooperate with the SEC to realize
subsidiarity’s ultimate objectives. Namely, the corporate whistleblower is
justified in escalating his or her concerns to the SEC in situations where
the corporation cannot, or will not, take appropriate action by themselves.
If the corporation has failed to protect the human dignity and value of the
whistleblower, for example, then positive subsidiarity supports regulatory
intervention. The most obvious examples of this includes a corrupt
company that retaliates against an employee for refusing to cooperate with
unlawful activity, or that responds to an internal report by covering up the
violation. Such conduct, when ratified by the company, inevitably
compromises human dignity. A whistleblower certainly has the moral
authority or duty in such instances, to escalate the problem to a “higher”
level—such as the federal government—“to promote and protect the
human dignity.”337
In fact, positive subsidiarity insists not only that the whistleblower may
cooperate with prosecutors in such situations, but that the whistleblower
has a duty to exercise his or her “inherent right” to concern itself with the
common good.338 This suggests whistleblowers ought to be increasingly
treated as “gatekeepers.” Although unheard of thirty years ago, the value
of gatekeepers is now widely accepted.339 Still, only a few categories of
employees are compelled to blow the whistle on corporate malfeasance
under existing law.340 Positive subsidiarity suggests, however, that every
336
But see Marshall J. Breger, Government Accountability in the Twenty-First Century, 57 U.
PITT. L. REV. 423, 430 (1996) (“The principle of devolution, often called subsidiarity in the European
Union context, is based on the notion that decisions made closest to those affected are likely to be the
best informed and certainly the most democratically based.” (footnote omitted)); A. Michael Froomkin,
Of Governments and Governance, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617, 621 n.8 (1999) (“Subsidiarity is the
devolution of responsibility to smaller political units in the context of a federal system.”).
337
Vischer, supra note 297, at 115; see also Damon Linker, John Paul II, Intellectual, 103 POL’Y
REV. 12, 12 (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6912.
338
See Carozza, supra note 296, at 44.
339
Today the Business Roundtable issues statements on corporate governance supporting the role
of gatekeepers. Companies that do not have robust internal reporting systems are subjected to severe
criticisms by institutional investors and publicly derided. See Letter from Alexander Cutler, CEO of
Business Roundtable, to Reps. Scott Garret & Maxine Waters, U.S. Congress (Dec. 23, 2011),
available
at
http://http://businessroundtable.org/news-center/brt-letter-to-chairman-garrett-andrepresentative-waters-on-whistleblo/ (endorsing the Whistleblower Improvement Act and noting that
internal compliance systems remain a defense against unethical behavior).
340
For example, SOX requires principal executive and financial officers to personally certify
financial statements, including significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in controls and
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employee should be mandated to report potential securities violations.
That said, mandatory whistleblowing would be problematic under the
current bounty program because mandatory whistleblowers are not
currently eligible for a bounty. One solution would be to permit all
categories of employees to be eligible for a bounty. If internal reporting
were mandatory for all employees, it would no longer make sense to
disqualify one employee but not another. Instead, all employees would be
subject to the bounty program’s existing exhaustion requirement, or a
modified version of it, consistent with the principle of subsidiarity.
Positive subsidiarity also suggests certain definite responsibilities for
corporations. First of all, corporations must have good, effective
compliance programs. Much of the opposition to mandating internal
reporting was based on the fear that internal reporting systems were
ineffectual or, worse yet, a sham.341 If corporations are not held to their
responsibility to the community, this will inevitably foster a corporate
culture of lax enforcement and increasing insensitivity to human dignity.342
H.R. 2483 seeks to accomplish this goal as well. The bill would
require an employer to have a policy prohibiting retaliation.343 In addition,
the employer’s internal reporting system must allow for anonymous
reporting.344 Both of these institutional design conditions on employers
would help drive collaborative processes and overcome non-mutual selfinterest on the part of either the employer or the employee. Alternatively,
Congress could create an affirmative defense, but only for certain types of
securities law violations, such as securities fraud or foreign bribery. 345
Sen. Christopher Coons (D-DE) has publicly endorsed the idea of
amending the FCPA, for example, to create a compliance defense for
violations of that Act.346
Finally, positive subsidiarity means corporations should take a more
multi-layered approach to corporate compliance, recognizing there are a
procedures. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006)).
In addition to establishing a robust oversight role for independent auditors and the board’s audit
committee, SOX also contains an “up-the-ladder” reporting requirement which encourages corporate
counsel to disclose under certain circumstances information related to material violations of securities
law to the SEC. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 116 Stat. 784 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245); 17
C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2011).
341
Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 15, at 109.
342
Williams, supra note 319, at 18.
343
The Whistleblower Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 2483, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(2)(D) (2011).
344
Id.
345
At least one firm, however, is advising clients that information regarding foreign bribery is not
eligible for whistleblower bounty in the first place. See Larry P. Ellsworth, No Whistleblower Bounties
for FCPA Tips on Private Companies, JENNER & BLOCK (Sept. 28, 2011),
http://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/2962/original/No_Whistleblower_Bounties_for_FCPA_Ti
ps_on_Private_Companies.pdf?1319642124.
346
Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a New Era,
43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 140 (2011).
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variety of mediating structures between the whistleblower and the
corporation.347 Since no compliance program is perfect, it is essential that
companies construct a safety net of overlapping monitoring and reporting
systems.348 This is true both at the sub-corporate level, where individual
departments, ombudsmen and third-party hotlines play a critical role in
compliance, and at the supra corporate level, where industry/trade
associations, self-regulating organizations and the cooperation of various
stakeholders in the proposed rulemaking process help the SEC to realize
universal compliance norms and best practices.
VI. CONCLUSION
A good corporate compliance program depends for its success on the
corporation and its employees working together for their mutual benefit.
However, the SEC’s new bounty program undermines this collaborative or
cooperative arrangement by promoting the employee’s non-mutual interest
in a bounty. In addition, the SEC’s “employee knows best” approach
undermines the supremacy of internal over external whistleblowing as a
problem-solving mechanism.
Instead, the SEC should extend the
mandatory internal reporting requirement to all corporate whistleblowers
rather than just a few select categories of employees. This approach could
be developed by the courts through litigation or independently by the SEC
through further rulemaking. Alternatively, Congress could pass H.R. 2483,
which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services on December
14, 2011, to bring the Dodd-Frank Act more in line with this approach.
This across-the-board approach to mandating internal whistleblowing
would have three primary benefits. First, it would address the problem of
bad companies that are not compliant with the laws by making the internal
reporting requirement contingent on the employer having an effective
complaint process in the first instance. Second, it would reduce
over-reporting due to the inherent indeterminacy of badly drafted securities
laws and regulations, especially anti-corruption and anti-fraud laws.
Finally, it would address the growing integrity problem of bad employees
347
Although beyond the scope of this Article, subsidiarity also suggests there are multiple layers
of collaboration between the corporation and the government. This subject is more fully explored in
the field of New Governance. Scholars in this field such as Professors Cindy L. Estlund and Orly
Lobel advocate more dynamic, adaptive policy techniques to structure cooperative interactions between
agencies, industries and other stakeholders to increase both the efficiency add legitimacy of regulations
in areas such as occupational safety, environmental protection and, of course, securities law. Estlund,
supra note 178, at 325; Lobel, supra note 18, at 434.
348
See Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 40 (Aug. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://works.bepress.com/barbara_black/2/ (“An SEC rule that would impose a monitoring duty on both
broker-dealers and investment advisers would be a significant improvement in investor protection and
consistent with the modern reality.”).
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by providing the corporate whistleblower with the added benefit of
knowing that he or she did everything reasonably possible internally before
escalating the matter to the SEC.
In many ways, whistleblowers are the consciences of the corporations
they serve. The failure of the SEC’s new whistleblower bounty program to
promote the common good of community within corporations risks
returning corporate America to the days when employees who ratted on
their employers were considered morally repugnant and disloyal due to
their insider status. After all, a rich rat is still a rat. Instead, the efforts of
“real” whistleblowers, who do what they do because they expect their
cooperation to benefit others, ought to be protected, and when they are
retaliated against, they ought to be fully restored to their rightful positions,
rather than supplanting them with the devious stratagems of bounty
hunters. What corporate whistleblowers really need in order to do the right
thing is not more radical incentives, but radical justice. Providing a
comprehensive whistleblower compensation fund, a topic I hope to explore
more fully in my next article, may be the final missing piece to the solution
for making corporate whistleblowing moral.

